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INTRODUCTION 
For over six decades, police in Taiwan1 could lock up 
people they deemed “hooligans” (liumang)2 for years with at 
most a cursory review by the courts. It was not until Taiwan’s 
Constitutional Court (the “Court”)—also known as the Grand 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan—stepped in that important change 
began to occur, culminating in the ultimate repeal of the law 
                                                                                                             
1. In this Article, we use “Taiwan” to refer to the territory under the effective 
control of the Republic of China (“ROC”) government (including the island of Taiwan 
itself as well as Matsu, Penghu, and Kinmen (a.k.a. Jinmen or Quemoy)), unless 
otherwise specified. 
2. We use the pinyin Romanization of the Chinese characters for the term instead 
of translating “liumang” into English. Considering the lengthy development of the 
unique concept of liumang in Taiwan, it is not surprising that the term does not lend 
itself to easy translation. Varyingly translated as “hooligan,” “hoodlum,” and 
“gangster,” liumang does not fit squarely into the definition of any of these words. 
Hooligan raises images of youth and especially young sports fans who have crossed the 
line from exuberant to destructive behavior. Although hoodlum does not carry the 
same youthful connotation, it still implies a certain thuggish quality that does not 
necessarily embrace the full panoply of liumang behavior. The nuances among the 
various terms related to “hooliganitis” were humorously explored in a 1981 New York 
Times piece. See William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 16, 1981, at 9. 
Finally, “gangster,” by definition, indicates that the person is involved in some sort of 
shady, if not blatantly criminal, organization. Although the concept of liumang 
includes people involved in gangs, a person can act entirely independently when 
engaging in liumang behavior. “Liumang” further has a non-legal aspect and has 
played into popular culture both in Taiwan and Mainland China. For example, in his 
article titled Wang Shuo and Liumang (‘Hooligan’) Culture, Geremie Barmé explains, 
“Liumang is a word with some of the most negative connotations in the Chinese 
language. Here the expression is used loosely in an attempt to describe both a social 
phenomenon and its cultural refraction.” Geremie Barmé, Wang Shuo and Liumang 
(‘Hooligan’) Culture, 28 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 23, 28 (1992). As with the term 
“liumang,” the Liumang Act has a variety of translations, most notably “Act for the 
Prevention of Gangsters,” “Anti-Hoodlum Law,” and “Anti-Hooligan Act.” 
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that authorized the police-dominated process. As a result, in 
2009, all of Taiwan’s imprisoned liumang who did not have 
concurrent criminal sentences were released.  
The path toward abolition—albeit winding, long, and 
complex—is a glowing example of the judiciary, executive, and 
legislature carrying out their respective duties in a democratic, 
cooperative, and relatively transparent manner. In particular, 
the often-overlooked Court played an essential role in curbing 
police power. This Article discusses the detailed process by 
which judges, officials, and legislators—spurred by civic groups, 
lawyers and academics—brought about annulment of the 
relevant legislation, the Act for Eliminating Liumang (㩊倭㳩㮻
㡅ἳ) (The “Liumang Act” or “LMA”). Crucial to this process 
was a series of Court interpretations, combined with sustained 
efforts by law reform groups and a gradual realization by the 
legislative and executive branches that the Liumang Act could 
no longer be justified as compatible with the values of post-
martial-law, democratic Taiwan. The Court’s gradual 
invalidation of various provisions of the Liumang Act was a 
necessary, albeit standing alone insufficient, force behind the 
Act’s ultimate abolition. 
Part I of this Article introduces the former legal regime for 
punishing liumang. Part II takes a step back to explain how the 
Court functions and the scope of its powers. We address the 
Court’s initial interpretations regarding the punishment of 
liumang in Part III, followed in Part IV by a detailed analysis of 
the final interpretation and the two underlying petitions for 
constitutional review that stimulated it. Part V charts the 
Liumang Act’s rapid demise after the Court’s final 
interpretation. 
In Part VI, we look across the strait to consider what lessons 
Taiwan’s experience has for the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”) now that it has finally abolished its analogous police-
imposed punishment system of re-education through labor 
(“RETL”). Because of the extremely limited role of 
constitutional interpretation in the PRC, reforms to RETL had 
to await a purely political solution rather than a judicial decision 
or even a constitutional interpretation by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, the only PRC 
institution explicitly authorized to make such an interpretation. 
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The Decision of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central 
Committee in late 2013 announcing that RETL would be 
abolished provided the requisite political will to finally end 
RETL in December 2013. Abolition of RETL is an important 
milestone in the PRC’s journey to limit unfettered police power. 
Serious questions remain, however, about alternative 
punishment systems that are already being used in place of 
RETL. The issue now is whether the PRC truly took a step 
towards reining in police powers or merely shifted those powers 
to different forms of so-called “administrative” punishments” as 
well as increased application of some of the vaguer provisions of 
PRC criminal law.3 
I. THE LEGAL REGIME FOR PUNISHING LIUMANG 
Taiwan, an island one hundred miles away from the 
southeast coast of mainland China, was officially incorporated 
into China’s territory by the Qing Dynasty in 1683. In 1895, the 
Qing Dynasty, after being defeated in the first Sino-Japanese 
War, ceded Taiwan and its outlying islands to Japan. In 1945, 
however, at the end of World War II, Japan was forced to 
renounce jurisdiction over Taiwan and the island again fell 
under Chinese rule. The government of the Republic of China 
(“ROC”), controlled by President Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist 
Party (“Kuomintang” or “KMT”), reintegrated the island into 
the ROC’s territory. After losing the Chinese Civil War to Mao 
Zedong’s Communist Party on the Mainland in 1949, the KMT 
regime took refuge on the island of Taiwan, which was already 
under its martial law, and made the island its exclusive base for 
maintaining the ROC government.   
For the subsequent four decades, the KMT suspended parts 
of the ROC Constitution 4  and consolidated power in the 
executive branch and the military under the Temporary 
Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion 
                                                                                                             
3. See, e.g., Verna Yu, Labour Camps May Become a Thing of a Past, But What Will 
Replace Them?, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/
print/news/china/article/1347815/labour-camps-may-become-thing-past-what-will-
replace-them?utm_source=edm; infra Part VI (discussing the various police options, 
legal and illegal, for replacing re-education through labor (“RETL”)). 
4. MINGUO XIANFA [Constitution] (1947) (Taiwan), translated at http://english.
president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=434. 
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(“Temporary Provisions”). The KMT’s “complex structure of 
external and internal security organizations” wielded ultimate 
power over the island.5 The KMT’s ordinarily discreet, albeit 
tremendous, day-to-day police power was on full display during 
several high-profile outbreaks of public unrest. Among the most 
egregious exercises of repression were the violent silencing of 
protestors and dissidents following the “2-28” uprising of 
February 28, 1947, and the harsh government response to pro-
democracy demonstrations culminating in the notorious 
crackdown following the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident on 
International Human Rights Day. 
Throughout the martial law period, the police easily found 
support for their actions in suppression-friendly laws and 
regulations. Although outwardly aimed at liumang behavior, 
such as gang participation and gambling activities, the relevant 
legal framework—the Act for Eliminating Liumang During the 
Period of Communist Rebellion (The “1985 Liumang Act”) and 
its forerunner, Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing 
Liumang—also provided expedient measures for silencing 
political opponents who did not fit the conventional description 
of liumang.6 As was the case in practice under RETL on the 
Mainland, police unilaterally made the decision to condemn 
liumang. The punishment imposed on liumang at the time was 
the dreaded guanxun (䭉妻), translated literally as “control and 
training.” However, “control and training” was, in actuality, an 
extraordinarily harsh military-administered punishment that 
could be used to detain perceived troublemakers indefinitely.7 
                                                                                                             
5. Edwin A. Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to 
Soft Authoritarianism?, 99 CHINA Q. 481, 491 (1984). 
6. See Taiwan Sheng Jieyan Shiqi Qudi Liumang Banfa (⎘䀋䚩ㆺ♜㗪㛇⍾䶈㳩㮻
彎㱽) [Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing Liumang During the Martial Law 
Period] (1955) (Taiwan) [hereinafter Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing 
Liumang During the Martial Law Period], replaced in 1985 by Dongyuan Kanluan 
Shiqi Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (≽⒉㇉Ḫ㗪㛇㩊倭㳩㮻㡅ἳ) [Act for Eliminating 
Liumang During the Period of Communist Rebellion] (1985) (Taiwan). The more 
simply named Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (㩊倭㳩㮻㡅ἳ) [Act for Eliminating Liumang] 
[hereinafter Act for Eliminating Liumang] followed in 1992 and remained in effect 
until January 2009. 
7. The 1955 Measures provided a powerful means of locking up people under the 
guise of “studying life skills.” Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing Liumang 
During the Martial Law Period, supra note 6.
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The Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses served as a 
potent supplementary device for police during the martial law 
period. 8  Under that law, a counterpart to the PRC’s then-
prevailing Security Administration Punishment Regulations, 
police could summarily detain people for up to two weeks at 
local police stations for a wide range of minor offenses with no 
participation by prosecutorial or court officials.9 
In 1971, one scholar commented on the police’s broad 
discretion: “Administrative regulations have defined an 
extremely broad area within which the police have a free hand 
to use whatever methods they consider effective and proper.”10 
Consequently, despite the fact that the KMT had brought with it 
to Taiwan the ROC’s Criminal Procedure Code (↹ḳ姜姇㱽),11 
police could easily avoid the judicial process required by the 
Code. Although the KMT’s tight grip on the judiciary during the 
years of martial law virtually guaranteed desired outcomes if it 
chose to invoke the formal criminal process, in many cases—
especially politically charged ones—it was more convenient to 
bypass the judicial system by resort to administrative 
punishments. 
The government announced the cancellation of martial law 
on July 15, 1987, but the actual transition of power from military 
to civilian authorities took several years. The government only 
abolished the Temporary Provisions in 1991 and did not dissolve 
the feared Taiwan Garrison Command that presided over the 
military justice system until July 31, 1992, marking the definitive 
shift to civilian control. 
In contrast to the entrenched police repression on the 
Mainland under Communist rule, the past twenty years have 
witnessed a startling transformation of Taiwan’s criminal justice 
                                                                                                             
8. Wei Jing Fa Fa (㐪㆙⨩ἲ) [Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses] 
(promulgated Sept. 3, 1943, effective Oct. 1, 1943, last amendment Oct. 21, 1954) 
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=
D0080077. 
9. For a detailed description of policing practices in Taiwan, see generally Jeffrey 
Martin, A Reasonable Balance of Law and Sentiment: Social Order in Democratic Taiwan from 
the Policeman’s Point of View, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 665 (2007). 
10. Lung-Sheng Tao, Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist China, 19 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 747, 764 (1971). 
11. XINGSHI SUSONG Fa (↹ḳ姜姇㱽) [Criminal Procedure Code] (promulgated 
July 28, 1928, amended June 23, 2010) (Taiwan), available at http://
db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp.  
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system. Perhaps the most immediately notable shift was the 
transformation of the draconian, military-run guanxun into the 
Ministry of Justice’s ganxun (デ妻) or “reformatory training,” a 
more conventional form of imprisonment for which judicial 
review, albeit truncated, was required in every case. 
Even during the waning years of martial law, Taiwan began 
to see the beginnings of judicial involvement in decisions that 
had formerly been left exclusively to the police. The 1985 
Liumang Act had introduced the use of special “public security 
tribunals” (㱣⬱㱽⹕) within the district courts to determine 
whether allegedly serious liumang should be incarcerated, but 
those courts provided little check, both because of daunting 
procedural barriers to mounting a defense and the courts’ 
general pro-KMT/police propensity.12 Even the 1992 version of 
the Liumang Act changed little with regard to procedures, as the 
police continued to have tremendous discretion to incarcerate 
people for up to three years. This discretion was meaningfully 
reined in only when the Constitutional Court became involved, 
as detailed in Parts III and IV below. 
The gradual decline in the previously unfettered 
punishment powers of Taiwan’s police must be viewed within 
the larger context of reforms to the criminal justice system that 
had gathered strong support. Beginning in the late 1990s, 
Taiwan’s Criminal Procedure Code underwent seismic changes, 
even while further reforms to the procedures for liumang cases 
appeared to stall and court review of serious liumang cases 
remained behind closed doors without any prosecutorial 
involvement and using heavily truncated judicial proceedings.    
The National Judicial Reform Conference in 1999 laid out 
the framework for sweeping criminal procedure reforms that 
introduced a “reformed adversarial system” (㓡列⺷䔞ḳṢ忚埴
ᷣ佑). This reform sought to elevate the roles of defense counsel 
and prosecutors in the courtroom, shift judges to a more neutral 
position and place the burden of proof squarely on the 
                                                                                                             
12. Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a 
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 554 (2002) (“In the 
context of authoritarian rule, the KMT judicial authorities usually paid limited 
attention to the dignity or human rights of the accused.”). 
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prosecutors.13 As reforms progressed, the judiciary, legislature, 
and executive gradually recognized the untenable gap between 
the new procedures applied to “criminal” cases and those used 
for “liumang” cases. The fact that suspected liumang often faced 
concurrent criminal charges for the same acts underscored the 
overlap between the Liumang Act and the Criminal Code (ࡁ⌅) 
and cast further doubt on the perceived continuing need for the 
Act. 
Over time it became clear that the Liumang Act was 
increasingly anachronistic when viewed against Taiwan’s 
Criminal Procedure Code Yet, as Taiwan’s criminal justice 
system cruised forward to embrace sweeping reforms, the 
Liumang Act somehow fell off the bandwagon and was left 
stumbling to catch up. For years, the Liumang Act remained an 
aberration, but unique is not the same as unconstitutional. As 
explained in more detail below, the Constitutional Court heard 
challenges to the Liumang Act in 1995 and 2001, yet both times 
the Court, while taking certain responsive actions, declined to 
strike down the Act in its entirety. The Legislative Yuan, in turn, 
revised the Liumang Act in response to each constitutional 
interpretation, but the main substance of the Act remained 
intact. After the Court’s 2001 interpretation, reformers became 
concerned that the momentum behind abolishing the Liumang 
Act had all but ceased. 
Then, in the fall of 2007, the Justices solicited opinions 
from legal experts on two additional petitions challenging the 
constitutionally of the Liumang Act that had been long pending 
before the Court.14 The hope among critics of the Act was that 
the Court would finally hold that the entire Act was 
unconstitutional. Instead, in Interpretation No. 636 issued on 
February 1, 2008,15 the Court held only that the Liumang Act 
had to again be revised in a piecemeal fashion, as had been 
                                                                                                             
13. Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked Challenge 
of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 665–66 (2009). 
14. As noted below, petitions for constitutional interpretations are not publicly 
available, which means that people either learn their contents through the legal 
grapevine or only when the Constitutional Court publishes its decision to accept or 
reject the petition. Infra Part II. 
15. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008), translated at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=636. 
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done in 1995 and 2001 in Interpretation Nos. 38416 and 523,17 
respectively. It was the Court's view that, in its capacity as the 
guardian of the ROC Constitution, it was not the Court’s job to 
demand repeal of the entire Liumang Act if more modest action 
was sufficient to solve the constitutional infirmities. As a result, 
the fate of the Liumang Act once again shifted to the legislature, 
which had to decide whether to repeal the Act or keep it alive, 
albeit in an increasingly altered form. 
Interpretation No. 636 apparently persuaded Taiwan’s 
political elite that the Liumang Act was proving to be more 
trouble than it was worth. After President Ma Ying-jeou took 
office in May 2008, the Executive Yuan recommended its 
abolition. In January 2009, the legislature took the dramatic step 
of repealing the Liumang Act in its entirety. The Court’s 
repeated, careful review of the Liumang Act was vital to pushing 
the legislature into action. 
II. STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
To understand the important role of the three relevant 
constitutional interpretations in the demise of the Liumang Act, 
it is first necessary to take a step back and explain the structure 
of constitutional review in Taiwan.  
The Constitutional Court is the final arbiter in questions 
that require interpretation of the ROC Constitution (២⌅) and 
is further charged with unifying the interpretation of laws.18 
Unlike ordinary judges in Taiwan, who have lifetime 
appointments subject to limited exceptions,19 a Justice on the 
Court is limited to an eight-year term. The shift from lifetime to 
                                                                                                             
16.  J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384. 
17. J.Y. Interpretation No. 523 (Const. Ct. Mar. 22, 2001), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=523 . 
18. Although not of importance in the liumang context, the Constitutional Court 
also holds the power to dissolve political parties that are deemed in violation of the 
Constitution. See Sifa Yuan Da Faguan Shenli Anjian Fa (ྖἲ㝔኱ἲᐁᑂ⌮᱌௳ἲ) 
[Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law] arts. 19–33 (promulgated Sept. 15, 
1948, amended Feb. 3, 1993) (Taiwan) [hereinafter CIPL], translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73. 
19. See MINGUO XIANFA art. 78 (1947) (Taiwan). Article 81 of the Constitution 
provides for lifetime tenure except if the judge has been found guilty of a criminal 
offense, subjected to disciplinary action, or declared to be under interdiction. See id. 
art. 81.  
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eight-year terms—and a reduction in the number of Justices 
from seventeen to fifteen—occurred in 2003. 20  In order to 
facilitate this transition and create a staggered appointment 
system, eight of the fifteen Justices were appointed to four-year 
terms in 2003, with the other seven serving eight-year terms. A 
Justice’s term may not be renewed. Nevertheless, because of the 
newness of the eight-year term system, it remains to be seen 
whether the Additional Articles of the Constitution will be 
interpreted to allow a Justice to be reappointed a few years after 
stepping down from the bench. If a future president decides to 
nominate a person who has previously served as a Justice, it 
could result in a protracted battle because the nominee not only 
would need to pass through the mud-wrestling politics of the 
Legislative Yuan but also would need an interpretation from the 
Court holding that the Additional Articles of the Constitution 
allow for such a reappointment. 
Justices are drawn from five categories: (1) Supreme Court 
judges; (2) members of the Legislative Yuan; (3) distinguished 
professors; (4) judges from international courts or other public 
or comparative law specialists; and (5) people who are highly 
reputed in the legal field and have political experience. 21 
According to the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan (ਨ⌅䲒㍴㒄
⌅), no more than one-third of the Justices shall qualify under 
any single one of these five categories.22 Yet, an early study notes 
that the Constitutional Court is dominated by academics and 
career judges.23 As of 2005, the Court was composed of seven 
                                                                                                             
20. Despite not taking effect until 2003, these changes were adopted in 2000 as 
part of revisions to the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC. See 
ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN (୰⳹Ẹᅧ᠇ἲቔಟᲄᩥ) [Additional 
Articles of the Constitution of the ROC] art. 5, translated at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
news/additional.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). The Additional Articles were last 
amended in 2005. 
21. See Sifa Yuan Zuzhi Fa (ਨ⌅䲒㍴㒄⌅) [Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan] art. 
4, §1 (promulgated Mar. 31, 1947, amended Jan. 21, 2009) (Taiwan), translated at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p07_2asp?lawno=81 These general 
categories only set forth the minimal qualifications. For example, not every Supreme 
Court judge is qualified to serve on the Constitutional Court: the judge must have 
served on the Supreme Court for more than ten years and have a distinguished record 
during that time of service. Id.  
22. See id. § 2. 
23. See Thomas Weishing Huang, Judicial Activism in the Transitional Polity: The 
Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 8 (2005) (“Despite 
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Justices from the judiciary, seven from academia, and one from 
government.24 Notably, twelve of these Justices were educated 
abroad as well as at home.25 It is unclear how the Taiwanese 
government reconciled this composition with the statutory one-
third rule. Roughly half of the Justices’ terms expired at the end 
of 2007. By March 2008, there were only eleven sitting Justices; 
the four vacancies resulted from a failure of the KMT-controlled 
Legislative Yuan to approve the nominees of then President 
Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party. These 
vacancies were filled after Ma Ying-jeou assumed office and, by 
May 2009, the Court was back up to its full bench of fifteen and 
remained at fifteen as of April 2014.26 
Petitions for constitutional interpretations reach the Court 
through several channels, many of the details of which are set 
forth in the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law (ਨ⌅
䲒བྷ⌅ᇈሙ⨶ṸԦ⌅)27 and its Implementing Rules (ਨ⌅䲒བྷ⌅
ᇈሙ⨶ṸԦ⌅ᯭ㹼㍠ࡷ ). 28  Central and local government 
agencies may file a request when they are uncertain about how 
the Constitution pertains to the exercise of their powers or when 
they are uncertain about the constitutionality of a particular law 
or order that affects their work. For example, government 
agencies may apply when there is a dispute among them about 
the meaning of the Constitution. Natural persons, legal persons, 
and political parties may also apply for constitutional 
interpretations when they believe that their constitutional rights 
have been infringed. In this case, there is a requirement that all 
other judicial remedies be exhausted before the request is filed, 
and the request must be directed at the constitutionality of the 
law or order that was applied by the court of last resort.29 When 
                                                                                                             
the guidelines for selecting Justices, the statistics show that the Constitutional Court has 
been dominated by academics and professional judicial careerists.”). 
24. See id. 
25. See id. (explaining that statistics “show that Justices have overwhelmingly been 
educated abroad, particularly in Germany, Austria, and the United States”). 
26 . See Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan-Justices, http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).  
27. This law is more directly translated as the “Law Governing the Hearing of 
Cases by the Grand Justices, Judicial Yuan,” but we use the generally accepted 
translation in this study. 
28. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 5. 
29. At the time of writing, the Judicial Yuan had approved—but the legislature 
had failed to pass—revisions to the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law that 
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reviewing petitions filed by natural or legal persons, the 
Constitutional Court does not decide individual cases as does 
the US Supreme Court. Rather, it examines the constitutionality 
of a law or order divorced from the concrete case that gave rise 
to the request for an interpretation. Accordingly, in 
Interpretation No. 636, there is no mention of the particular 
facts of the liumang cases that prompted the petitions. Members 
of the Legislative Yuan may also request an interpretation when 
they are uncertain either as to the application of the 
Constitution itself or the constitutionality of a particular law. In 
this situation, at least one-third of the members of the 
Legislative Yuan must agree to the petition’s filing. 
Finally, with respect to judges, in 1995 the Constitutional 
Court held in Interpretation No. 371 that a judge may suspend 
proceedings sua sponte (i.e., by the judge’s own volition) and 
apply for a constitutional interpretation when the judge believes 
that a statute or regulation that is before the court is 
unconstitutional. 30  Indeed, the first time a judge used this 
procedure was to question the constitutionality of the Liumang 
Act, and this same procedure was used in the petitions that led 
to Interpretation No. 636. Interestingly, this judge-initiated 
procedure is the only means of filing a petition that is not 
provided for in the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
Law. 
Turning to the substance of the petition, the Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure Law provides that a petition must 
include the following components: (1) purpose of the petition; 
(2) issues and facts, and the related constitutional provisions; 
(3) grounds for the petition, position adopted by the petitioner, 
and arguments; and (4) list of exhibits attached.31 These general 
                                                                                                             
would introduce a number of procedural changes, including that citizens would no 
longer have to exhaust all channels for relief. See Press Release, Judicial Yuan, Sifa Yuan 
Yuanhui Tongguo Sifa Yuan Da Faguan Shenli Anjian Fa Xiuzheng Cao’an (ྖἲ㝔㝔
᭳㏻㐣ྖἲ㝔኱ἲᐁᑂ⌮᱌௳ἲಟṇⲡ᱌) [Judicial Yuan Approves Draft Revisions to 
the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law] (2013), available at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p10_02.asp?id=109037. 
30 . J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20 1995). The 
Constitutional Court’s decision to allow judges in all lower courts to adjourn 
proceedings and refer constitutional questions to the court was significant in that it 
indirectly broadened citizens’ access to obtain constitutional interpretations early in 
the litigation process. 
31. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 8. 
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requirements are clarified on the Judicial Yuan’s website, along 
with clerical issues such as the size of paper that petitioners must 
use. 
The first step when the petition comes in the door is for a 
panel of three Justices to review it, determine whether the 
petition meets the above procedural requirements, and, if the 
requirements are met, pass it along to the full Constitutional 
Court for further discussion.32 If the petition is denied by the 
full court after review by the three-Justice group, the Court will 
issue a “decision not to accept the petition” (нਇ⨶⊪䆠). 
Neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Interpretation 
Procedure Law expressly authorizes the Constitutional Court to 
pick and choose cases based on their perceived importance. In 
practice, we were told that the Court sometimes rejects petitions 
if the Justices think that they have no constitutional 
importance.33 To avoid criticism, the Court might not clearly 
state the reason for rejection and instead note that the petition 
fails to state which provisions of the law in question violate 
specific constitutional articles or that the petition simply does 
not raise constitutional issues. For example, in April 2014, the 
Court rejected the applications of three death row inmates who 
claimed that the death penalty is unconstitutional.34 Although 
the stated reason was that the applicants did not specify why the 
death penalty violated the ROC Constitution, it is unclear to 
what extent this procedural explanation was also a convenient 
way to avoid addressing controversial issues. In rejecting the 
applications, the Court acknowledged there are questions 
regarding both the constitutionality of the death penalty as well 
                                                                                                             
32. See id. art. 10. From conversations with people familiar with the workings of 
the Constitutional Court, we were told that the fifteen Justices are divided into five 
subgroups, and petitions are assigned by rotation. 
33 . In writing this Article and the related book, we relied on Taiwan’s 
conventional laws, rules and regulations, judicial decisions and other government 
publications, scholarly writings, newspaper and magazine articles, conversations with 
judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, and scholars; as well as visits to government 
agencies, police stations, and even the institutions for punishing liumang. Names have 
been redacted from all conversations, as was promised to the people with whom we 
spoke. 
34. See, e.g., Wang Wenling, 3 Si Fan Shenqing Shi Xian Quan Shu Bei Bohui (3 Ṛ≢
⫆ㄳ㔚᠇ ඲ᩝ⿕㥍ᅇ [3 Death Penalty Petitions Dismissed in Full], UDN.COM (Apr. 18, 
2014, 8:24 PM), http://udn.com/NEWS/BREAKINGNEWS/BREAKINGNEWS2/
8621632.shtml. 
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as whether it violates international human rights norms that 
have been incorporated into Taiwan’s domestic law. The Court 
may also delay acceptance for long periods, as was seen in the 
case of the petitions addressed in Interpretation No. 636. 
Constitutional Court decisions, which are consecutively 
numbered, are made publicly available and are conveniently 
posted on the Judicial Yuan’s website.35 For example, in Decision 
No. 1269, issued on July 30, 2005, the Court announced its 
decision to reject thirty-seven petitions, one of which addressed 
the Liumang Act. In a few paragraphs, the Decision describes 
the petition and the reasons why the Court rejected it. The 
petitioner had been committed to reformatory training by the 
public security tribunal of the Taipei District Court, and the 
public security tribunal of the Taiwan High Court had rejected 
his appeal. The Constitutional Court denied his challenge to the 
constitutionality of several provisions in the Liumang Act and its 
Implementing Rules (⃒㚵⍱≃ọֻᯭ㹼㍠ࡷ) because the 
petition failed to meet the requirements of the Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure Law; namely, the public security 
tribunal did not rely upon the challenged provisions in the 
Liumang Act when making its decision.36 Albeit cold comfort for 
the petitioner, the decision was at least helpful to future 
petitioners in that it provided guidance regarding arguments 
that the Court found inadequate. 
The rejected petitioner in the above example is far from 
being in the minority. The Court accepts only a tiny percentage 
of petitions for constitutional interpretations. As reported in an 
introductory brochure issued by the Court, from July 1, 1948, to 
September 30, 2003, the Court received 7640 petitions and 
issued only 566 decisions. Among the 7640 petitions filed, 815 
(10.67%) were filed by governmental agencies, whereas 6825 
were filed by individuals (89.33%). The pattern of only 
accepting a small number of cases has continued in recent years. 
Since 1998, the number of interpretations announced in any 
one year has ranged from a high of twenty-eight in 1998 to a low 
of 13 in 2007. According to the Judicial Yearbook, in 2007, the 
Court dismissed 348 cases and issued interpretations in only 13, 
                                                                                                             
35 . Interpretations, JUSTICES CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, R.O.C., http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03.asp. 
36. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 5, § 1. 
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with 176 cases listed as pending.37 In 2009, the Court dismissed 
412 cases and issued interpretations in only 16, with 246 cases 
listed as pending.38 
If a petition is among the rare few that are accepted, the 
Justices will proceed to analyze the merits and select a Justice to 
draft an opinion, which the designated Justice will circulate 
among all the Justices for discussion prior to voting.39 Standard 
practice is for Justices to meet three times per week, with extra 
sessions held “when necessary.” 40  Oral arguments giving 
petitioners and others an opportunity to be heard in person are 
seldom convened, though the Court may call for them “when 
necessary.”41 There is no elaboration regarding what this vague 
“when necessary” provision actually means in practice. When 
one of the authors of this Article visited the Constitutional 
Court’s elegant courtroom, the judge showing it joked that this 
was probably one of the few times that the room’s lights were 
turned on that year—an exaggeration, but there was more truth 
than jest in his observation. Our research team was pleasantly 
surprised when the Court convened a hearing to discuss the 
petitions that led to Interpretation No. 636 and called on one of 
our Taiwanese research colleagues to appear as an expert. 
Once the draft opinion is ready for a vote to adopt an 
interpretation regarding the constitutionality of a statute, two-
thirds of the Justices must be present to constitute a quorum, 
and the agreement of two-thirds of those Justices present is 
required. The two-thirds quorum requirement is the same for an 
interpretation when a government order is at issue, but the 
agreement of only a majority of those Justices present is 
required.42 The author of the majority opinion is not disclosed, 
though Justices may issue individual concurring and dissenting 
opinions, which can be quite colorful and impassioned. The 
majority opinion itself is composed of the “holding” of the 
interpretation and a separate “reasoning” section that, true to 
                                                                                                             
37.  Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38.  
38. Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38.  
39. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 11. 
40. Id. art. 15. 
41. Id. art. 13. 
42. Id. art. 14. 
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its name, details the bases for the Constitutional Court’s 
holding.43 
The Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law provides 
that the interpretation may instruct relevant agencies of the 
need to execute the interpretation and, further, determine the 
types and means of execution so required. 44  This general 
provision is the basis for the Constitutional Court’s power to go 
beyond a mere declaration that a law is unconstitutional and 
actually order other government bodies to take action. As an 
alternative to telling other government bodies the means by 
which the interpretation shall be executed, the Court may 
simply declare a law, regulation, or order null and void and 
leave the other bodies to decide what action to take. A modified 
approach sometimes preferred by the Court is to declare that 
the law, regulation, or order will become null and void after a 
specified period, as was used by the Court in the three 
interpretations regarding the Liumang Act. The next Part turns 
to the Court’s specific involvement in scrutinizing the 
constitutionality of the Act and, ultimately, prompting the other 
branches of government to repeal it. 
III. INITIAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN CURBING POLICE 
POWER 
Although individual liumang decisions by the police 
formally became subject to court review as early as 1985, the 
special “public security tribunals” (㱣⬱㱽⹕) within the district 
courts provided little check, both because of daunting 
procedural barriers to mounting a defense and the courts’ 
general pro-KMT/police propensity.45 Revisions to the Liumang 
Act in 1992 failed to change this review from cursory to 
substantive. It was only when the Constitutional Court stepped 
in that real change began to occur. 
The Constitutional Court first addressed the Liumang Act 
in 1995. In Interpretation No. 384, the Court declared that five 
                                                                                                             
43. Id. art. 17, § 1. 
44. Id. § 2. 
45. See Wang, supra note 12, at 554 (“In the context of authoritarian rule, the 
KMT judicial authorities usually paid limited attention to the dignity or human rights 
of the accused.”). 
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articles of the Liumang Act were unconstitutional.46 First and 
foremost, the Court held that Articles 6 and 7, which 
empowered the police to force people to appear without any 
judicial approval, violated the right to physical freedom of the 
person (Ӫ䓛㠚⭡), as provided in Article 8 of the Constitution. 
Article 8 requires that, except in the case where a person is 
discovered while committing a crime or immediately thereafter 
(i.e., in flagrante delicto), no person shall be arrested or detained 
other than by judicial or police agencies in accordance with 
“procedures prescribed by law.” The Court further emphasized 
that any law used to deprive people of their physical freedom 
must be proper in substance (ަޗᇩᴤ丸ሖ䌚↓⮦) and comply 
with Article 23 of the Constitution, which provides that 
freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution shall not 
be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent 
infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an 
imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public 
welfare. After stating these constitutional bases, the Court held 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Liumang Act unconstitutional because, as 
then written, they authorized the police to force people to 
appear before them without following any judicial procedures. 
In accordance with this Interpretation, the legislature revised 
the articles that addressed the police’s authority to force 
suspected liumang to appear for questioning. The revised 
articles required that police first obtain judicial approval or, 
when exigent circumstances required immediate action, that 
there be prompt judicial review after the fact. 
Second, the Constitutional Court held in Interpretation 
No. 384 that the secret witness system as then set forth in Article 
12 of the Liumang Act deprived the accused of the right to 
defend oneself and hampered the truth-finding function of the 
Court. Despite this holding, the resulting revisions that allow for 
secrecy only “when necessary” did little in reality to increase the 
transparency of the witness system. 
Third, the Court struck down the practice of requiring 
people to serve time in prison followed by time in reformatory 
training, or vice versa, for the same act. The Justices began by 
                                                                                                             
46. J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384. 
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noting that, as then written, Article 21 of the Liumang Act 
allowed the imposition of reformatory training after execution 
of a criminal punishment for the same act, without regard to 
whether there was a special preventive necessity to do so. This 
practice, the Justices explained, could result in the loss of bodily 
freedom (䓛億㠚⭡).  
The legislature revised Article 21 to provide that, if the 
liumang behavior for which the accused was committed to 
reformatory training was also the basis for criminal punishment, 
time spent serving the criminal punishment and time spent in 
reformatory training would be mutually set-off (⴨ӂᣈᣥ) on a 
one-day-for-one-day basis. Finally, the legislature expanded the 
relief channels available to liumang in response to the Court’s 
holding that Article 5 failed to protect the constitutional right to 
lodge administrative appeals and institute administrative 
litigation.47 
Notably, shortly before issuance of Interpretation No. 384, 
the Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses passed into 
history. And, once again, the Court played a key role in the 
process. In 1990, the Court declared that certain provisions of 
that law would cease to be effective on May 1, 1991, because 
those provisions violated the Constitution’s protection of 
physical freedom. In response, the legislature replaced the 
offending law with a new Social Order Maintenance Law that 
addresses mild disruptions of social order and is still in use 
today.48 This law covers a wide array of offenses ranging from 
illegally using another person’s identifying documents, to 
maltreating animals, to willfully picking another person’s flowers 
or other vegetation.49 
The maximum punishment under the Social Order 
Maintenance Law is detention (㊀䔁 ) of up to five days. 
Significantly, the courts—not the police—have the power to 
impose this punishment. The law specifies clear judicial 
decision-making procedures. Aside from enumerated minor 
violations for which detention is never allowed, if the police, 
                                                                                                             
47. MINGUO XIANFA art. 16 (1947) (Taiwan). 
48. Shehui Zhixu Weihu Fa (♫᭳⛛ᗎ⥔ㆤἲ) [Social Order Maintenance Law] 
(June 29, 1991) (Taiwan), translated at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/
LawContent.aspx?PCODE=D0080067. 
49. See id. arts. 66, 79, 88. 
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following investigation, believe detention is necessary, they must 
transfer the case to the district court for a ruling by the summary 
division, in which single judges decide cases based on the files 
and without requiring a hearing. If the court orders detention 
and, without a valid reason, the violator does not appear after 
receiving notice, only then can the police force the person to 
appear. The law further includes a chapter on “Relief” (㓹㾇) 
for people who wish to challenge their punishment. In 2009, 
6690 new social order maintenance cases were filed with the 
district courts, representing a noticeable decrease from the 8754 
cases filed in 1998.50 Of the 6294 cases closed in 2009, 2028 
people were sentenced to detention. Of those people, 1569 were 
sentenced to one day and only one person was sentenced to over 
three days.51 
Interpretation No. 523, issued in 2001, precipitated more 
modest reforms to the Liumang Act than its predecessor. This 
time, the Justices held that the procedures used for confining 
suspected liumang under Article 11 of the Liumang Act violated 
Articles 8 and 23 of the Constitution: 
This confinement . . . is a serious restraint on people’s 
physical freedom. Nevertheless, the Act does not explicitly 
provide the conditions upon which a court may base its 
imposition of confinement . . . . The Act grants the court 
discretion to decide the accused’s confinement without 
regard for whether he is continuing to seriously breach 
social order, or if he will obstruct the court’s hearing of the 
case by fleeing, destroying evidence, or threatening 
informants, victims, or witnesses.52 
The Constitutional Court held that the offending 
provisions would become null and void one year from the date 
of the Interpretation. Within that year, in 2002, the legislature 
revised Article 11 by including specific criteria for determining 
whether confinement was required and by adding two new 
articles (Articles 11-1 and 11-2) that detailed procedures for 
canceling (᫔䣧), stopping (ڌ→), and repeating (޽Ҹ⮉㖞) 
confinement. 
                                                                                                             
50. Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38, tbl. 71. 
51. Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38, tbl. 72. 
52. J.Y. Interpretation No. 523 (Const. Ct. Mar. 22, 2001), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=523.s 
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Several years passed with no action from the Constitutional 
Court, despite reported calls for further judicial review.53 Then, 
on January 28, 2005, Judge Guo Shu-hao, a public security 
tribunal judge from the Taichung District Court, applied for an 
interpretation (the “Taichung Petition”). 54  Judge Guo 
suspended proceedings in a liumang case pending before him 
because of doubts about the constitutionality of the Liumang 
Act. In December 2005, a similar petition was submitted by a 
second public security tribunal judge, Judge Qian Jian-rong of 
the Taoyuan District Court (the “Taoyuan Petition”).55 Nearly 
two years of silence followed. Eventually, in the autumn of 2007, 
the Constitutional Court convened a hearing to address the 
issues raised in these two petitions. Interpretation No. 636 
followed on February 1, 2008. The detailed legal arguments 
behind this final and most important interpretation are taken 
up in the next Part. 
IV. INTERPRETATION NO. 636 
In the Taichung Petition, Judge Guo presented a targeted 
challenge to the definition of “liumang,” arguing that several of 
the enumerated categories of liumang behavior violated the 
constitutional principle of legal clarity (⌅ᖻ᰾⻪ᙗ৏ࡷ ). 
Although Judge Qian, in the Taoyuan Petition, also raised this 
argument, he mounted a more sweeping attack on the Liumang 
Act, ranging from the constitutionality of the secret witness 
system to the practice of imposing both reformatory training 
and criminal punishments for the same act. The main 
constitutional arguments raised in the petitions are discussed 
below, along with the Court’s responses thereto. 
                                                                                                             
53. The influential Judicial Reform Foundation (≁䯃ਨ⌅᭩䶙ส䠁ᴳ) formed a 
group to study the Liumang Act. The group suspended its efforts, however, after its 
petitions failed. Further Constitutional Court interpretations supported by the group 
and other efforts to repeal the Liumang Act were similarly unsuccessful. 
54. Guo Shu-hao, Petition for J.Y.  Interpretation (filed with Const. Ct. Jan. 28, 
2005) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Guo Shu-hao petition]. 
55. Qian Jian-rong, Petition for J.Y.  Interpretation (filed with Const. Ct. Dec. 16, 
2005) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Qian Jian-rong petition]. 
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A. Definition of Liumang and the Principle of Legal Clarity 
The two petitions vigorously challenged the 
constitutionality of the statutory definition of liumang. In the 
Taichung Petition (the narrower of the two), Judge Guo focused 
on two categories in the definition and argued that the 
descriptions therein violated the constitutional principle of legal 
clarity. Sections 3 and 5 of Article 2, as then written, listed the 
following types of liumang behavior: 
3) People who occupy territory; commit blackmail and 
extortion; force business transactions; eat and drink without 
paying; coerce and cause trouble; tyrannize good and 
honest people; or manipulate matters behind the scenes to 
accomplish the foregoing. 
. . . 
5) People who are habitually morally corrupt or who 
habitually wander and act like rascals and the facts are 
sufficient to believe that they have undermined social order 
or endangered the life, body, freedom, or property of 
others. 
Judge Guo honed in on the following four types of behavior, 
though his petition indicated that other parts of the definition 
possibly also failed to pass constitutional muster: coercing and 
causing trouble (㾱᥮⓻һ ); tyrannizing good and honest 
people (Ⅺ༃ழ㢟); being morally corrupt (૱㹼ᜑ࣓); and 
wandering and acting like rascals (䙺㮙❑䌤). According to 
Judge Guo, it violated the right to physical freedom, as provided 
for in Article 8 of the Constitution, to incarcerate people based 
on these descriptions. 56  Quoting the Constitutional Court’s 
holding in Interpretation No. 384, Judge Guo contended that 
these sections failed to satisfy the requirement that any law used 
to deprive people of their physical freedom must be proper in 
substance. Moreover, he asserted that the provisions failed to 
comply with Article 23 of the Constitution, which provides that 
freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution shall not 
                                                                                                             
56. As previously discussed, Article 8 of the Constitution provides, in part, that 
“physical freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. In no case except that of flagrante 
delicto, which shall be separately prescribed by law, shall any person be arrested or 
detained other than by a judicial or police organ in accordance with procedures 
prescribed by law.” MINGUO XIANFA art. 8 (1947) (Taiwan). 
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be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent 
infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an 
imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public 
welfare. 
Judge Guo explained that one aspect of laws being proper 
in substance is the principle of nulla poena sine lege (㖚ࡁ⌅ᇊѫ
㗙), namely, the principle that there be no punishment without 
a law authorizing it. This requirement is a basic component of 
what is broadly known as the principle of legality—the 
foundational principle that laws be clear and ascertainable. In 
the criminal context, this requires that people be able to 
determine what acts are being criminalized.57 Otherwise, the law 
does not serve as an effective guide and people are left without 
understandable rules to which they can conform. The 
Constitutional Court explicitly addressed the principle of 
legality in Interpretation No. 384, in which it wrote that 
“substantive due process of law covers both substantive law and 
procedural law and, for substantive law, it must comply with the 
principle of nulla poena sine lege.”58 Likewise, as part of the 
Taoyuan Petition’s more broad-based attack on the Liumang Act, 
Judge Qian contended that the definition of liumang violated 
“the principle of nulla poena sine lege” (㖚ࡁ⌅ᇊѫ㗙) and “the 
principle of clarity of crimes and punishments” (㖚ࡁ᰾⻪ᙗ৏
ࡷ).59 
                                                                                                             
57. As described by one American scholar:  
The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is the principle of legality, which 
today means that criminal liability and punishment can only be predicated on 
a prior legislative enactment that states what is proscribed as an offense in a 
precise and clear manner. This is a concept that is reliant on various 
doctrines, most significantly the “void for vagueness” doctrine and the 
doctrine of “strict construction.” 
John. F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American 
Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 244–45 (2002). 
58. J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384. 
59. Judge Qian wrote that “the principle of clarity of crimes and punishments” is 
an important component of nulla poena sine lege (㖚ࡁ⌅ᇊ৏ࡷ䟽㾱Ⲵޗ⏥ѻаቡᱟ㖚
ࡁ᰾⻪৏ࡷ). Exact phrasing aside, this is a “void for vagueness” argument. In the same 
section of his petition, Judge Qian further raised the principle of equality (ᒣㅹ৏ࡷ), 
namely that people should be treated equally under the law and they should not be 
subject to unreasonable disparities in treatment (൷៹ᒣㅹሽᖵ, нᗇᴹнਸ⨶Ⲵᐞࡕᖵ
䙷). Yet, the fact that there was great disparity in the application of the Liumang Act 
appears to be more a result of the vagueness problem than a separate ground on which 
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Although not apparent in the text of the Liumang Act, the 
principle of legal clarity—specifically nulla poena sine lege—is 
explicitly provided for in the Criminal Code. Article 1 provides 
that, to be punishable, behavior must be clearly stipulated as 
punishable by law at the time of the act. This provision, however, 
is of no concrete guidance in the liumang context because the 
Criminal Code is freestanding. A challenge to the liumang 
definition thus had to be rooted directly in the text of the 
Constitution. The problem is that it is less than clear as to how 
“clear” a law must be to satisfy constitutional concerns. The very 
contours of the principle of legal clarity are hard to pin down. 
To give shape to this abstract principle, Professor Jaw-perng 
Wang of National Taiwan University School of Law advocated 
looking outside Taiwan. In commentary on the constitutionality 
of the Liumang Act that Professor Wang gave at an academic 
conference and later submitted to the Constitutional Court,60 he 
explained that the principle of clarity for criminal laws (ࡁ⌅᰾
⻪৏ࡷ) is equivalent to the US constitutional principle of “void 
for vagueness.”61 Professor Wang cited the writings of a US legal 
                                                                                                             
to challenge the Act. Judge Qian introduced various aspects of inequality that were 
raised by the Liumang Act’s application. First, for people who committed a criminal act 
and who were also determined to be liumang—as compared with pure criminal 
defendants (i.e., those not simultaneously targeted as liumang)—there was an 
unreasonable disparity in treatment. Second, within the realm of liumang, various 
categories of people (i.e., as described by Judge Qian, warned liumang, serious 
liumang, recidivist liumang after a warning, recidivist liumang after reformatory 
training, and serious liumang who are caught in the act) received significantly different 
treatment, and it was difficult to articulate the criteria for making the distinctions. Qian 
Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 11. That similarly, or in some cases identically, 
situated people were in jeopardy of being subject to unequal treatment was vividly 
demonstrated by a case in which a district-court public security tribunal judge ruled 
that two people who bird-napped pigeons were not serious liumang. On appeal, one 
panel took the position that the accused was a serious liumang, and the other ruled 
that the behavior did not have the requisite characteristic of being an offensive 
violation. The exact same factual scenario thus led to two contrasting outcomes. 
60 . Jaw-perng Wang, Professor, National Taiwan University School of Law, 
Speaker at the National Taiwan University School of Law’s Conference: “Taiwan’s 
System for Dealing with Liumang: Constitutionality, Criminal Justice, and Broader 
Implications” (Dec. 14, 2006). Prof. Wang’s address was later published in 2008. In 
November 2007, Professor Wang was asked by the Constitutional Court to present his 
views on whether the Liumang Act was constitutional. 
61. See Wang, supra note 60, at 9; see also Jaw-perng Wang, Yige Tiaoli, Bachu 
Weixian: Lun Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (аػọֻˈޛ㲅䚅២—䄆⃒㚵⍱≃ọֻ) [The 
Liumang Act: One Law, Eight Unconstitutional Aspects], 155 YUETAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN 
L. REV.] 121 (2008). 
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scholar, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., in explaining the principle’s 
theoretical underpinnings. 62  Jeffries draws upon three 
intertwined doctrines. First is the principle of legality, which 
“stands for the desirability in principle of advance legislative 
specification of criminal misconduct.” 63  Simply put, the 
principle condemns judicial crime creation.64 Second, Jeffries 
addresses the vagueness doctrine, which he describes as “the 
operational arm of legality”: “It requires that advance, ordinarily 
legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise—or at least 
that it not be meaninglessly indefinite.”65 The third doctrine, 
the rule of strict construction, provides that criminal statutes be 
strictly construed against the state.66 Jeffries describes this rule as 
“[t]he second doctrine said to implement the ideal of legality.”67 
Professor Wang centered his argument on the vagueness 
doctrine, as did Judges Guo and Qian. In view of the extremely 
mushy wording of the contested provisions in the liumang 
definition, it is hard to see how the rule of strict construction 
would be of any help. The definition is not merely ambiguous, 
rather it is hopelessly vague68 How can one strictly construe the 
phrase “wandering and acting like rascals”?69 
                                                                                                             
62. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 
Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985). 
63. Id. at 190. 
64. Id. at 189. 
65. Id. at 196 (citations omitted). 
66. This rule that ambiguity in a criminal law be resolved against the government 
and to the advantage of the accused is also known as the “rule of lenity.” 
67. Jeffries, supra note 62, at 198. 
68. In his article, Professor Decker, explains: “A relative of vagueness, ambiguity 
appears where otherwise understandable legislation lends itself to two or more equally 
plausible interpretations.” Decker, supra note 57, at 243. Despite being two distinct 
concepts, it is not always clear when legislation tips from being ambiguous to vague, or 
vice versa: “at what point is it permissible to conclude the legislation contains sufficient 
specificity that it can be described as ambiguous rather than vague?” Id. 
69. Neither Judges Qian nor Guo pursued what would be called an “overbreadth 
argument” in American jurisprudence: 
If a party challenges an enactment based on the assertion that one cannot 
determine whether the regulation intrudes upon otherwise “innocent 
terrain” then the complaint is one of vagueness. On the other hand, if a 
challenge is based on an objection that the regulation does, in fact, intrude 
into territory where it does not belong, then the claim is one of overbreadth. 
Id. at 266. For example, neither judge contended that the Liumang Act could be used 
against people who were staging peaceful demonstrations outside Taiwan’s Presidential 
Palace, a not infrequent occurrence. 
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In his commentary, Professor Wang explored three reasons 
raised by Jeffries as to why an unclear provision in the criminal 
law should be void for vagueness.70 First, a vague provision 
violates the separation of powers principle. In those 
circumstances, the legislature has essentially abandoned its 
responsibility to define crimes, leaving the courts to take the 
legislature’s rightful place.71 In liumang cases, the courts were 
left to flesh out abstract phrases, such as “habitually morally 
corrupt,” with no legislative guidance. The overarching 
legislative requirement that the conduct in question be 
“sufficient to have undermined social order” raised similar 
concerns because it forced judges into the shoes of legislators. 
The Implementing Rules’ further paltry guidance that conduct 
be “unspecific” (୙≉ᐃ), an “offensive violation” (✚ᴟ౵ᐖᛶ), 
and “habitual” (័ᖖᛶ) was of little, if any, help.72 
Second, a vague provision violates the doctrine of notice 
because the government fails to give people fair notice of what 
constitutes criminal behavior. As explained by the US Supreme 
Court, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of 
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, 
violates the first essential of due process of law.”73 Did the 
Liumang Act give fair warning as to when a person’s behavior 
crossed the line between being merely unsociable and rude and 
instead being downright unlawful? Could a person of common 
intelligence determine at what point he transformed himself 
from a contemptible but legal louse to a liumang? 
In the Taichung Petition, Judge Guo asserted that people 
were unable to predict when the Liumang Act would apply to 
their conduct because of the lack of clarity in the definition of 
liumang. Judge Guo pointed out that, not only were the 
aforementioned types of liumang behavior unclear, but also 
there were no supplemental criteria that made them more 
                                                                                                             
70. See Wang, supra note 61, at 11. 
71. See Jeffries, supra note 62, at 202. 
72. Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli Shixing Xize (⃒㚵⍱≃ọֻᯭ㹼㍠ࡷ) [Implementing 
Rules for the Act for Eliminating Liumang], art. 4 (promulgated Nov. 27, 1985) 
(Taiwan). 
73. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citations 
omitted). 
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concrete. While acknowledging that absolute clarity is 
impossible, Judge Qian emphasized the need for people to be 
able to predict what conduct the law proscribes and argued that, 
as such, the individual requirements of a crime’s components 
must be concretely described. Like Judge Guo, he attacked the 
definition of liumang because it failed to provide the necessary 
guidance for people to understand what exactly was proscribed. 
The Implementing Rules’ listing of three characteristics of 
behavior “sufficient to have undermined social order” was 
stunningly unhelpful in providing concrete guidance both to 
individuals who might be deemed liumang and, as explained 
further in the following paragraph, to judges who needed to 
interpret the law. Indeed, both petitions were written by public 
security tribunal judges whose jobs were to apply the abstract 
criteria to specific cases on a daily basis. No one was better 
suited to give a candid appraisal of how the liumang criteria 
worked in practice, or did not work, as the case appeared to be. 
Third, unclear criminal laws are unable to control the 
indiscriminate exercise of power by the authorities because 
there is no ascertainable standard of guilt. In other words, there 
is a threat of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because 
people enforcing the law can essentially base decisions on 
personal preferences.74 Of course, a modicum of discretion is 
unavoidable, and often desirable, in any criminal justice system. 
The question is when discretion tips from being a positive force 
into one that creates an enforcement free-for-all. Professor 
Wang contended that this third rationale was the strongest basis 
for the Constitutional Court to hold that certain provisions in 
the liumang definition were unconstitutionally vague. 75  In 
particular, he argued that the following proscribed behaviors 
listed in Article 2(3) and (5) were unconstitutional because 
people enforcing the law ended up doing so in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner: occupying territory (䵨քൠⴔ); eating 
and drinking without paying (ⲭਲ਼ⲭ்); tyrannizing good and 
honest people (Ⅺ༃ழ㢟); being morally corrupt (૱㹼ᜑ࣓); 
and wandering and acting like rascals (䙺㮙❑䌤).76 
                                                                                                             
74. See Jeffries, supra note 62, at 212. 
75. See Wang, supra note 60, at 12. 
76. See id. at 12. 
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As Judge Qian pointed out, there were problems with the 
inherent lack of clarity in the criteria upon which police 
identified warned liumang and serious liumang.77 Even if a 
person satisfied the general liumang definition, the Liumang 
Act added another layer of complexity by separating liumang 
into two categories. Those in the first, milder category, received 
sanctions limited to a warning (⏲婉) and a one-year “guidance” 
period—a period of police-administered supervision resembling 
probation.78 The term “guidance” (庼⮶) is a bit of an Orwellian 
euphemism because during the one-year period the emphasis 
was more on observing the person’s behavior rather than 
counseling him to reform. These “warned liumang” (⏲婉庼⮶
㳩㮻—literally “liumang warned and under guidance”)79 did not 
see the inside of a courtroom, except in the rare event that one 
eventually challenged the determination of his status in 
administrative court. In contrast, a person alleged to be in the 
second category, a “serious liumang” (ね䭨慵⣏㳩㮻—literally 
“liumang for whom the circumstances are serious”), was 
brought before a public security tribunal, and this tribunal 
decided whether the person would undergo reformatory 
training. The average man on the street would likely have no 
idea that such a distinction existed. The difference in terms of 
the procedures and sanctions applied to these two separate 
varieties of liumang was, however, substantial. 
In addition, there was a concern that police in different 
areas of Taiwan took divergent views regarding what qualified as 
“serious” behavior, as compared with behavior that only 
warranted “warned” liumang status.80 Because the less you see 
something the stranger it is, police in areas with fewer liumang 
were said to be more likely to pursue someone as a serious 
liumang than in areas where liumang were more prevalent. For 
example, consider a case where the police determined that 
                                                                                                             
77. See id. at 13. 
78. The criminal law allows for probation for certain offenders. See ZHONGHUA 
MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] arts. 92–93 (amended June 11, 2013) (Taiwan). 
79. The phrase “liumang warned and under guidance” is used interchangeably 
with “liumang listed in the register and under guidance.” This register was maintained 
by the police and contained the names of all liumang currently under guidance. 
Warned liumang were also colloquially referred to as “ordinary liumang,” a term that 
was used by several interviewees who took part in this study. 
80. See Wang, supra note 60, at 11. 
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someone was a liumang on the basis that he was “eating and 
drinking without paying” because he ate and drank, refused to 
pay, and even threatened a bar owner who requested payment. 
What if the alleged liumang had paid his bills and never 
threatened the bar owner directly, but the rest of his behavior 
remained the same? Or if this same person was unemployed and 
spending his days loafing around in bars, frequenting gambling 
dens, and behaving aggressively toward people. Was his behavior 
“morally corrupt,” or merely “morally astray” without rising to 
the level of being liumang behavior? Could the authorities have 
found that he was coercing and causing trouble; tyrannizing 
good and honest people; being morally corrupt; or wandering 
and acting like a rascal? The police and judges were left to make 
this judgment with extremely limited guidance. It is this specter 
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that had Professor 
Wang and Judges Guo and Qian concerned. 
This argument regarding the lack of legal clarity in the 
definition of liumang partly won over the Constitutional Court. 
In Interpretation No. 636, the Justices parsed the definition of 
liumang and declared the following two clauses unconstitutional 
because they violated the principle of legal clarity: the act of 
“tyrannizing good and honest people” (Article 2(3)) and 
“people who are habitually morally corrupt or who habitually 
wander and act like rascals” (Article 2(5)). The Court further 
held that the acts of “occupying territory,” “eating and drinking 
without paying,” and “coercing and causing trouble” were 
constitutional but problematic, and the Court thus called on 
relevant authorities to evaluate the possibility of concretely 
describing these acts. The Justices addressed several other 
aspects of the definition and found no constitutional 
problems.81 The Court’s decision to pluck out discrete offending 
                                                                                                             
81. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 holding, para. 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2008), translated at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?
expno=636. (“The provision of Article 2, Section 3, of the [Liumang Act] regarding the 
acts of ‘committing blackmail and extortion, forcing business transactions, and 
manipulating matters behind the scenes to accomplish the foregoing’; the provision of 
Section 4 of the same Article regarding the acts of ‘managing or controlling 
professional gambling establishments, establishing brothels without authorization, 
inducing or forcing decent women to work as prostitutes, working as bodyguards for 
gambling establishments or brothels, or relying on superior force to demand debt 
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provisions and leave the definition of liumang largely 
unchanged was consistent with its prior measured approach 
when reviewing the constitutionality of the Liumang Act. 
An attack on the substantive definition of liumang was but 
one of several challenges to the Liumang Act. The following 
Sections address criticisms that were aimed at various procedural 
aspects of the Act. When analyzing the various challenges, it is 
important to bear in mind the fundamental bifurcated scheme 
that distinguished warned liumang from serious liumang. The 
comparatively severe ramifications of being classified as a serious 
liumang were underscored by Judges Guo’s and Qian’s 
challenges to the Liumang Act, which overwhelmingly focused 
on serious liumang. 
B. Power of the Police to Force Suspected Liumang to Appear 
In the Taoyuan Petition, Judge Qian looked again to Article 
8 of the Constitution, this time to challenge the police’s ability 
to force people to appear, as provided for in Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 
and 11 of the Liumang Act. Prior to Interpretation No. 384, 
Article 6 of the Liumang Act provided that, if a person was 
found to be a liumang and the circumstances were serious, the 
police had the power to summon the person without prior 
warning and, if the summoned person did not comply, to force 
him to appear at the police station. Article 7 similarly provided 
that, if a person reengaged in liumang behavior within a year 
after a determination that he was a liumang, the police had the 
power to summon him; and, if the summoned person did not 
comply, the police could force him to appear at the station. For 
people caught while engaging in liumang behavior, the police 
could take them directly into custody without any prior 
summons. In Interpretation No. 384, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that the Liumang Act’s failure to differentiate 
between people caught in the act and people apprehended at a 
later time violated Article 8 of the Constitution, which clearly 
distinguishes between the two situations and prescribes different 
procedures. As a result of this Interpretation, the legislature 
revised the Liumang Act to require that police first obtain 
                                                                                                             
repayment’; and the provision of Article 6, Paragraph 1, regarding ‘“serious 
circumstances”’ do not violate the principle of legal clarity.”). 
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judicial approval or, when exigent circumstances required 
immediate action, that there be prompt judicial review after the 
fact. Judge Qian contended that these revisions did not go far 
enough. 
Judge Qian argued that the procedures and criteria in the 
Liumang Act were constitutionally lacking when viewed against 
the procedures for arrests under exigent circumstances in the 
Criminal Procedure Code. For example, he pointed to the 
comparatively “strict reasons and requirements” for emergency 
arrests (⥭ᛴᣊᤕᛴ) in Article 88-1 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 82  which in part permits emergency arrests when the 
person is a potential flight risk, provided that the alleged offense 
is punishable with the death penalty, life imprisonment, or a 
minimum prison sentence of not less than five years.83 Here, 
“emergency arrest” means an arrest made by the police 
unilaterally under exigent circumstances. The Liumang Act did 
not have an equivalent restriction and, indeed, the punishment 
for liumang could never reach five years because reformatory 
training was statutorily capped at three. 
Judge Qian further pointed to the differences between the 
procedures for arresting a person caught in the act of 
committing liumang behavior (ᐿ᪋୰) and a person caught in 
the act of committing a crime (⌧⾜≢).84 Under the Criminal 
Procedure Code, an emergency arrest is subject to immediate 
review by a prosecutor.85 The Liumang Act, in contrast, skipped 
prosecutorial review and the case proceeded to the court 
directly, which Judge Qian argued was insufficient as compared 
                                                                                                             
82. Although Judge Qian used the term “emergency arrest” (‘⥭ᛴᣊᤕ’) in the 
Taoyuan Petition, Article 88-1 uses slightly different terminology, namely “discretionary 
arrest” (‘㏶⾜ᣊᥦ’). In general, the Criminal Procedure Code uses different terms for 
arrest with a warrant (‘ᣊᥦ’) and without a warrant (‘㐊ᤕ’). In practice, “arrest 
without a warrant” means arrest under exigent circumstance, such as when a person is 
caught in the act. Neither a “discretionary arrest” nor an “arrest without a warrant” 
requires a warrant at the time that the person is physically taken into custody. They are 
different, however, in that after a “discretionary arrest,” the police must obtain a 
warrant (issued by a prosecutor, not a judge) or the arrestee must be released. In 
contrast, after a straightforward “arrest without a warrant,” the police need not obtain a 
warrant and may simply send the arrestee to the prosecutor. 
83. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 15. 
84. XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 92 (promulgated July 28, 
1928, amended June 23, 2010) (Taiwan); see also Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra 
note 6, art. 10. 
85. XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 92. 
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with the advanced review provided to criminal suspects. These 
and other examples raised by Judge Qian highlight aspects 
where the Criminal Procedure Code provides different, and 
convincingly more stringent, limitations on the police’s ability to 
arrest suspects. In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional 
Court agreed, to a certain extent, that the Liumang Act’s 
procedural requirements were not only less stringent, but also 
unconstitutional. 
The Court began the reasoning section of Interpretation 
No. 636 by emphasizing the fundamental right to physical 
freedom that is contained in Article 8 of the Constitution. The 
Court went on to quote Article 6 of the Liumang Act regarding 
arrests without warrants, but did so to announce only that the 
phrase “circumstances are serious” did not contradict the 
principle of legal clarity. 86  Interpretation No. 636 failed to 
address squarely the issue of arrests under exigent 
circumstances. That being said, the Court did declare that 
procedures for transferring an accused liumang to court against 
his will were unconstitutional. 87  The Court added that 
procedures for requiring warned liumang to appear if they 
                                                                                                             
86. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 reasoning, paras. 6–9 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2008). 
When a person is determined to be a [liumang] and the circumstances are 
serious, the police precinct of the directly governed municipality or police 
department of the county (city), with the consent of the directly supervising 
police authorities, may summon the person to appear for questioning without 
prior warning. If the summoned person does not appear after receiving 
lawful notice and does not have proper grounds for failing to appear, then 
the police may apply to the court for an arrest warrant. However, if the facts 
are sufficient to lead the police to believe that the person is a flight risk and 
there are exigent circumstances, then the police may arrest him without a 
warrant . . . So-called ‘serious circumstances’ shall be determined according 
to the common societal conception of this provision and shall take into 
consideration the means used to carry out the act, the number of victims, the 
degree of harm, and the degree to which social order was undermined when 
examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
circumstances are serious. This provision does not contradict the principle of 
legal clarity. 
Id. 
87. Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra note 6, art. 9 (“If a person voluntarily 
appears before and is questioned by the police but does not wish to be transferred to 
the court, the police may not compel him to be transferred to the court. Doing 
otherwise would violate due process of law.”); J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 
reasoning, para. 9 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008). 
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committed another liumang act should be interpreted in the 
same manner.88 The Court dismissed other challenges to Articles 
9, 10, and 11 on procedural as well as substantive grounds.89 
Formal constitutional arguments aside, we see no 
compelling reason why the procedures for summons and 
transfers in liumang cases should have been different from, and 
indeed less protective than, those in criminal cases. Nor could 
we find any persuasive, or even cogent, evidence that liumang 
suspects were inherently more dangerous or flight-prone than 
criminal suspects. Moreover, in view of the huge overlap 
between criminal and liumang cases, it would have made 
practical sense to have consistent procedures: the police were 
likely to summon a suspect for both purposes. The legislature’s 
decision to repeal the Liumang Act thus strikes us as infinitely 
reasonable from a procedural standpoint. 
C. Right to Be Heard by the Review Committee 
A second procedural challenge addressed in Interpretation 
No. 636 was the right of accused liumang to be heard by the 
review committee, which held the power to declare a suspect to 
be a warned liumang or transfer the suspect to the court for a 
determination whether he was a serious liumang. At the time of 
Interpretation No. 636, accused liumang had no opportunity to 
participate in this determination process, with the first 
                                                                                                             
88. Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra note 6, art. ĸ. 
89. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 reasoning, para. 15 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2008). 
As for the petitioners’ position that the constitutionality of the provisions of 
Article 2, Paragraph 1, and Articles 10, 14, and 15 of the Act are in doubt, 
they are not the legal provisions that the judge in the case at hand shall apply. 
The constitutionality of these provisions does not influence the results of the 
court’s ruling. In addition, the petitioners allege that the constitutionality of 
Article 2, Section 2; the proviso of Article 6, Paragraph 1; the proviso of 
Article 7, Paragraph 1; and Articles 9, 11, 22, and 23 are in doubt, and further 
question the constitutionality of the Act as a whole. The grounds raised by the 
petitioners in support of the unconstitutionality of the foregoing provisions 
are insufficient to constitute concrete reasons for an objective belief that the 
statute is unconstitutional. These two parts of the petition do not meet the 
requirements set forth in this Council’s Interpretations Nos. 371 and 572 and 
are therefore dismissed. 
Id. 
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indication that they were even under suspicion usually coming 
in the form of official notice of the committee’s decision. 
For the first time, in Interpretation No. 636, the 
Constitutional Court declared that an accused liumang was 
entitled to a voice before the review committee. The Court 
noted that the diverse membership of the review committee—
including police, prosecutors, legal specialists, and impartial 
people from society—was conducive to promoting objective 
decision-making. Nonetheless, in order to comply with the 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law, “the accused 
must have the right to be heard during the proceedings, in 
addition to the right to receive relief after receiving an 
unfavorable decision.”90 This newly articulated right was never 
implemented because of the decision to repeal the Liumang 
Act, but we nonetheless applaud this belated recognition that 
accused liumang should have been allowed some form of earlier 
participation in the committee’s proceedings. 
D. Serious Liumang: Procedures at the District Court Level 
Challenges to procedural aspects of the Liumang Act were 
not limited to the stages when the case was in the hands of the 
police. Judge Qian and other critics raised weighty concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of procedures used once cases 
reached the district courts for handling by public security 
tribunals. Concerns were focused on the use of a secret witness 
system, the lack of prosecutorial involvement, and the denial of 
a public hearing. 
1. The Secret Witness System and the Right to Confront and 
Examine Witnesses 
The Constitutional Court dealt an initial blow to the secret 
witness system in Interpretation No. 384, in which it held that 
the unfettered use of secret witnesses, as then allowed by Article 
12 of the Liumang Act, deprived the accused of the right to 
defend himself and hampered the truth-finding function of the 
court. However, the resulting revisions that allowed for secrecy 
only “when necessary” did little to increase the transparency of 
                                                                                                             
90. See id. para. 8. 
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the witness system because in practice secrecy was deemed 
necessary almost without exception. This raised the question 
whether the system of using secret witnesses “when necessary” 
passed constitutional muster in view of the reality that the 
exception of secrecy had swallowed the general rule of 
transparency and confrontation. Judge Qian answered “no” and, 
in Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court agreed. 
In the Taoyuan Petition, Judge Qian also contended that, 
even as revised, Article 12 of the Liumang Act deprived the 
accused of his right to confront and examine witnesses in 
violation of the right to physical freedom as it relates to the 
principle of “proper legal procedures” (ṇ␜ἲᚊ⛬ᗎཎ๎), 
which is commonly translated as “due process.” Here, again, 
Article 8 of the Constitution was the primary constitutional basis, 
though the argument also rested on the right to institute legal 
proceedings in Article 16. For concrete support, Judge Qian 
looked to Interpretation No. 582,91 issued in 2004, in which the 
Court addressed whether out of court statements made by a 
criminal co-defendant against another co-defendant should be 
admissible in court. Prior to Interpretation No. 582 and the 
adoption of hearsay rules in the Criminal Procedure Code, all 
out-of-court statements by one co-defendant were admissible 
against another co-defendant, regardless of the context. In 
Interpretation No. 582, the Court began its holding by stating 
that Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees people the right 
to institute legal proceedings (ッゴḒ). As far as a criminal 
defendant is concerned, this guarantee includes the right to 
defend oneself adequately in a legal proceeding. Crucial to 
Judge Qian’s argument was the court’s statement that a criminal 
defendant’s right to examine a witness is a corollary of the right 
to defend oneself and is also protected by the principle of due 
process.  
Judge Qian argued that the Court’s reasoning in 
Interpretation No. 582 should be extended to accused liumang. 
He posited that legislation can “restrict,” but not “deprive” 
people of, the right to confront witnesses because a deprivation 
violates the proportionality principle (ẚ౛ཎ๎)—the principle 
                                                                                                             
91. See J.Y Interpretation No. 582, 17 SHIZI 519 (Const. Ct. July 23, 2004), 
translated at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=582.  
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that measures must be reasonable, the least restrictive possible, 
and not excessive.92 Judge Qian continued that Article 12 of the 
Liumang Act crossed the line between a constitutionally 
allowable restriction and a flat-out deprivation because it 
allowed judges to “refuse” an accused liumang’s request to 
confront and examine witnesses.  
The stark deprivation of an opportunity to confront 
witnesses in liumang cases stands in contrast to Taiwan’s more 
creative Witness Protection Law ( ㆇ ே ಖ ㆤ ἲ ), 93  which 
emphasizes the use of voice alteration and other protective 
measures as alternatives to cutting off all questioning of the 
witness by the accused. Judge Qian thus continued that while a 
criminal defendant may have had access to an adverse witness 
under the Witness Protection Law, in a companion liumang 
case, the witness suddenly underwent a “metamorphosis” and 
became a secret, unavailable witness. Not only did this 
difference in treatment of criminal defendants and accused 
liumang violate the principle of equality (ᖹ➼ཎ๎) according 
to Judge Qian, the use of secret witnesses in liumang cases was 
even more pernicious because it acted as a tool for people (and, 
most alarming, police) who harbored grudges and sought 
retaliation. 
The Constitutional Court agreed that the secret witness 
system was constitutionally deficient. Specifically, the Justices 
explained in Interpretation No. 636 that Article 12 of the 
Liumang Act restricted the accused’s rights to confront and 
examine witnesses and to access court files without requiring the 
tribunal to take into consideration whether, in view of the 
individual circumstances of the case, other less intrusive 
measures were sufficient to protect the witness’s safety and the 
voluntariness of his testimony. For instance, the Court cited the 
                                                                                                             
92. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 18. The Constitutional Court stated 
in Interpretation No. 471 that this principle is enshrined in Article 23 of the 
Constitution, which provides that freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution 
shall not be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon 
the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or 
to advance public welfare. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec. 
18, 1998). 
93. Zhengren Baohu Fa (ㆇேಖㆤἲ) [Witness Protection Law] (promulgated 
May 30, 2006) (Taiwan), translated at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/Law
Content.aspx?PCODE=A0030161. 
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use of masks, voice alteration, and other protective measures as 
possible alternatives. The Court held that Article 12 was clearly 
an excessive restriction on the accused’s right to defend himself 
in a legal action and was inconsistent with the principle of 
proportionality. The Court further held that procedures violated 
the principle of due process of law under Article 8 of the 
Constitution and the right to institute legal proceedings under 
Article 16 of the Constitution. The secret witness provision as 
then written in the Act was to be null and void one year from the 
Interpretation’s date of issuance. 
The Legislative Yuan, in response, could have adopted a 
modified “when necessary” formulation. In Interpretation No. 
636, the Constitutional Court qualified its critique of the secret 
witness system by stating that to protect witnesses from 
endangering their lives, bodies, freedom, or property as a result 
of being confronted and examined, the rights of the accused 
and his lawyer may be restricted by concrete and clear statutory 
provisions that comply with the principle of proportionality 
under Article 23 of the Constitution. The decision to repeal the 
Liumang Act rendered this issue moot. Today, the primary law 
regulating access to witnesses in criminal cases remains the 
Witness Protection Law. As noted above, the Court went further 
in Interpretation No. 636 than only addressing confrontation of 
live witnesses: the Court also held that the Liumang Act 
unconstitutionally restricted the accused’s access to court files. 
Professor Wang, who appeared in front of the 
Constitutional Court to address the merits of the two judicial 
petitions, extended his critique to notification procedures. He 
contended that the procedures used to notify accused serious 
liumang that they were so accused violated the right to defend 
oneself. When the police transferred a liumang case to the 
public security tribunal pursuant to Article 9 of the Liumang 
Act, they were required to notify the accused liumang and his 
designated friends or relatives of this action. The police, 
however, were not required to provide the accused liumang with 
a copy of the transfer document (⛣㏦᭩). In a criminal case, 
the indictment (the equivalent to the transfer document in a 
liumang case) must be given to the defendant and must contain 
the items listed in Article 264 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
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including descriptions of the facts and evidence alleged.94 The 
indictment is required to list the allegations so that the 
defendant can defend himself in a meaningful way. Professor 
Wang argued that accused serious liumang were not given this 
same opportunity, and there was no legitimate reason for 
treating them differently from criminal suspects. 
The Constitutional Court did not address notification 
procedures in Interpretation No. 636, but we agree with 
Professor Wang that the difference in treatment between 
criminal and liumang suspects rose to the level of 
unconstitutional treatment. Put simply, failure to notify the 
accused in advance of the details on which charges are based 
denies him an adequate opportunity to answer the charges. 
This right is enshrined in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which provides that 
everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be entitled “[t]o 
be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against 
him.”95 The punishment dispensed to those determined to be 
serious liumang was the substantive equivalent of criminal 
punishment, so this right should have been applicable to those 
accused of being serious liumang.  
In 2009, following the repeal of the Liumang Act, Taiwan 
ratified and incorporated into its domestic legal system the 
ICCPR, along with the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 96  In 2013 ten independent 
international human-rights experts were invited to Taiwan to 
review its implementation of the two human rights covenants in 
accordance with the practice of the United Nations.97 Had the 
                                                                                                             
94. See Wang, supra note 61, at 16. 
95. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, § 3, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
96. See Ko Shu-Ling, Legislature Ratifies UN Rights Treaties, TAIPEI TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2009, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/01/2003439900. 
97 . Following the review, the experts released “Concluding Observations and 
Recommendations,” pointing out government practice inconsistent with the protections 
under the two human rights covenants. See REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS COVENANTS: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY 
THE INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, INT’L COV. ON CIV. & POL. 
RIGHTS (2013) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS], available at http://
www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/33516305719.pdf. For the review 
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Liumang Act survived, some of its remaining provisions may not 
have passed the scrutiny under the ICCPR. 
2. Lack of Prosecutorial Involvement 
Witnesses were seldom seen in the courtroom during 
liumang cases, but prosecutors were never present. Judge Qian 
asserted that the Liumang Act violated the principles of the 
separation of prosecution and adjudication (ᑂᷙศ㞳அ᥍ッཎ
๎) and the division of powers and functions (Ḓ⬟༐ศཎ๎) 
because no prosecutor was involved in the proceedings. Since 
prosecutors did not appear, this forced judges into roles unlike 
those seen in criminal cases. In criminal proceedings, after the 
initial police investigation, the prosecutors take a lead role with 
the police being subject to their direction. The prosecutor 
makes the crucial decision whether to prosecute. In liumang 
cases, the police made the decision whether to recommend that 
the accused be sent to confinement, with the only prosecutorial 
involvement being that a lone prosecutor sat on the review 
committee. No prosecutor took part in the judicial hearing, and 
lawyers only appeared in a minority of cases. Nor were the police 
a “party” in liumang court hearings. The law did not require 
that police attend the hearing and, in practice, the police did 
not fulfill the prosecutorial role in court. Clearly, the 
involvement of a prosecutor would have heightened professional 
and public confidence in the fairness and accuracy of the 
liumang adjudication system, but did the Constitution require 
it? 
We stop short of Judge Qian’s position that the absence of 
prosecutors during the actual court hearing was 
unconstitutional under either principles of the separation of 
prosecution and adjudication or the division of powers and 
functions. In liumang cases, the judge at least had the transfer 
document, which was prepared by the executive branch. The 
hearing itself closely resembled prior inquisitorial practices but 
                                                                                                             
process, see Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome Cohen, Forging Ahead, S. MORNING CHINA POST, 
Mar. 29, 2013; Yu-Jie Chen, A New Tool for Promoting Human Rights in Taiwan, CHINA 
POL’Y INST. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicy
institute/2013/03/24/a-new-tool-for-promoting-human-rights-in-taiwan/. 
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this alone is not sufficient to hold the related provisions of the 
Liumang Act unconstitutional.  
We do agree with Judge Qian that procedures under the 
Liumang Act did not comport with the spirit of recent reforms 
to Taiwan’s Criminal Procedure Code. Specifically, Judge Qian 
targeted Articles 22 and 23 of the Liumang Act, which addressed 
the composition and functions of the public security tribunal, as 
well as Articles 18 to 24 of the Implementing Rules, which 
elaborated the relevant provisions of the Liumang Act. We agree 
that he rightly questioned the wisdom of the public security 
tribunals’ inquisitorial method, specifically the practice of 
having public security tribunal judges play the dual role of 
questioning accused liumang and then deciding whether 
confinement was warranted. This practice stood in stark contrast 
to the modified adversarial system used for criminal proceedings 
today. The practice of having a judge serve in effect as both 
prosecutor and sole adjudicator in the courtroom before 
sentencing someone to three years in conditions that were 
virtually identical to a prison was arguably inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of due process in Taiwan. Procedures 
that may be permissible before merely imposing a fine or a short 
stay in a detention cell take on a different gloss when applied to 
a significant prison sentence. We will never hear the Justices’ 
official views on this issue because the Constitutional Court 
declined to address the relevant articles of the Liumang Act on 
procedural grounds. 
3. Lack of Public Hearings 
Another issue that is absent from Interpretation No. 636 is 
Professor Wang’s critique regarding the constitutionality of 
barring the public from the courtroom. Although the 
Constitutional Court did not address this argument in 
Interpretation No. 636, we believe that it deserves consideration. 
In his argument to the Court, Professor Wang maintained 
that the Constitution requires public hearings before the public 
security tribunals on the district court level. The system under 
the Liumang Act involved only the judge, the accused liumang, 
and sometimes his lawyer and witnesses, even if the accused 
liumang did not get to see and question them. It was a closed 
trial. Although Taiwan’s Constitution does not expressly grant 
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people the right to “a speedy and public trial,” as the Sixth 
Amendment to the US Constitution does,98  Professor Wang 
explained the bases for this right in Article 16 of the ROC 
Constitution (the right to institute legal proceedings), and 
Article 8 (the right to physical freedom).99 For support, Wang 
looked to Justice Wu Geng’s concurring opinion in 
Interpretation No. 368, in which he stated that the right to 
institute legal proceedings (ッゴḒ) in Article 16 includes the 
right to a public hearing.100 As a caveat, Interpretation No. 368 
did not address a liumang case, but Professor Wang proposed 
that the reasoning be extended to the liumang context. The 
Constitutional Court later flatly stated in the reasoning section 
of Interpretation No. 482 that the right to institute legal 
proceedings includes a public hearing, though this also was not 
in the context of a liumang case.101 
In the context of liumang cases, however, the Court had 
interpreted Article 8 of the Constitution to require due process 
and, in Interpretation No. 384, the Court noted that this 
encompassed the principle that trial proceedings should be 
open to the public. Therefore, Professor Wang explained, 
whether Article 8 or Article 16 was used as a basis, accused 
liumang should have a constitutional right to a public hearing. 
Due to the seriousness of the consequent punishment involved, 
we support this view. Moreover, as previously noted, the ICCPR 
requires that state parties afford people charged with crimes a 
“fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.”102 
                                                                                                             
98. In 2010, Taiwan passed a Speedy Trial Act (ฮ஦ጇ㏿ᑂุἲ). Although this 
Act is a step forward in decreasing the time that a case can be pending, as noted by the 
independent experts reviewing Taiwan’s implementation of the ICCPR, it still fails to 
meet international standards. See REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS, supra note 97 
(“Article 5 of the Speedy Trial Act 2010 further stipulates a maximum period of eight 
years of pre-trial detention, which, in the opinion of the Experts, violates the 
‘reasonable time’ limit of Article 9(3) ICCPR.”). 
99. See Wang, supra note 61, at 13. 
100. The majority opinion did not address this point, but it did note that the right 
to institute legal proceedings in Article 16 of the Constitution means that people have 
the right to demand through legal procedures a judicial remedy for the final 
disposition of disputes over jural relations. 
101. J.Y. Interpretation No. 482 (Const. Ct. Apr. 30, 1999), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=482. 
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR provides for an exception in limited cases: “The press 
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E. Serious Liumang: Punishment by Reformatory Training 
Critics of the Liumang Act forcefully criticized the manner 
in which serious liumang were punished. Challenges to the 
reformatory training system focused on the use of indeterminate 
sentences and the method of setting off time spent in 
reformatory training and serving criminal punishments. 
1. Indeterminate Sentences to Reformatory Training 
Under Article 13 of the Liumang Act, the public security 
tribunal had the authority to decide whether or not to impose 
reformatory training, but the tribunal did not decide the actual 
length of the sentence. Article 19 provided the standard 
duration: reformatory training was set at between one and three 
years with the possibility of release after one year, provided that 
the original ruling court agreed. In Judge Qian’s view, a public 
security tribunal’s ruling to commit a person to reformatory 
training violated the principle of clarity (᫂☜ᛶ) because the 
tribunal failed to state a definite sentence within the one- to 
three-year window.103 In other words, Judge Qian asserted that 
the indeterminate sentence left the liumang agitated and in fear 
all day.104 This, he argued, was constitutionally unacceptable. 
For support, Judge Qian relied on Interpretation No. 
471, 105  in which the Constitutional Court struck down a 
mandatory provision in the Firearms Act (ᵕ◙ᙕ⸩ยᲔ⟶ไᲄ
౛) that required three years of forced work (ᙉไᕤస⹦ศ) 
when a person was convicted of specified offenses,106 without 
considering the necessity of the three-year sentence in view of 
                                                                                                             
and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public 
order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest 
of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice” Id. art. 14 § 1. Similarly, the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan 
provides that court hearings shall be open to the public, see Sifa Yuan Zuzhi Fa (ਨ⌅䲒
㍴㒄⌅) [Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan] art. 86 (promulgated Mar. 31, 1947, 
amended Jan. 21, 2009) (Taiwan), though Taiwanese law allows limited exceptions, 
such as for trials involving juveniles, see Shaonian Anjian Chuli Fa (ᑡᖺ஦௳⹦⌮ἲ) 
[Juvenile Proceedings Act], art. 34 (promulgated May 18, 2005) (Taiwan). 
103. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 20. 
104. Id. 
105. J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998), translated 
at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=471. 
106. The article at issue, Article 19, has since been repealed. 
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the defendant’s particular situation. The Court explained that 
the failure to consider individual circumstances violated the 
proportionality principle.107 The Court held that judges may 
sentence people to three years of forced work but are not 
required to do so. The Court did not directly address 
indeterminate sentences in Interpretation No. 471. Judge Qian 
contended that the reasoning of this Interpretation should be 
extended to reformatory training and, accordingly, judges 
should be required to mete out definite sentences in liumang 
cases based on individual circumstances. Judge Qian further 
questioned the constitutionality of having the actual length of a 
liumang’s reformatory training decided by the administrative 
agencies that supervised the training. He argued that this 
practice violated the institutional protections of the 
constitutional right to institute legal proceedings and also 
violated the separation of powers principle.108 
Although Judge Qian threw a number of weighty 
constitutional principles at the practice of indeterminate 
sentencing under the Liumang Act, the Constitutional Court did 
not address them in Interpretation No. 636. Unlike the 
mandatory three-year-sentence provision that the Court held 
unconstitutional in Interpretation No. 471, the revised Liumang 
Act allowed for release from reformatory training after one year, 
subject to certain conditions. Nor did Judge Qian provide clear 
support for his position that it was unconstitutional for 
administrative agencies to recommend early release. Moreover, 
Judge Qian’s argument did not address the separation of powers 
among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. Based on 
Taiwan’s current governmental structure, the determination of 
how much of their sentences prisoners should serve and which 
institution should decide when prisoners can be released in 
individual cases should be left to the legislature and the 
executive, respectively. That said, those determinations should 
be made under sufficient constraints such that there is not 
unfettered discretion. For example, the parole provision in the 
Criminal Code provides that, subject to certain limitations, 
parole (೥㔚) is available for criminal offenders after they have 
                                                                                                             
107. MINGUO XIANFA art. 23. (1947) (Taiwan). 
108. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 21. 
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served half of their term of imprisonment, or twenty-five years of 
a life sentence.109 
2. Setting Off Reformatory Training and Criminal Punishments 
Prior to Interpretation No. 384, Article 21 of the Liumang 
Act allowed the imposition of reformatory training either before 
or after execution of a criminal punishment for the same act, 
without regard to whether there was a special preventive 
necessity to do so. In Interpretation No. 384, the Constitutional 
Court held that this practice violated the constitutional 
guarantee of physical freedom, and it gave the legislature until 
the end of 1996 to fix the problem. Article 21 of the revised 
Liumang Act provided that, if the liumang behavior for which 
the accused was committed to reformatory training was also the 
basis for criminal punishment,110 time spent serving the criminal 
punishment and time spent in reformatory training would be 
mutually set off on a one-day-for-one-day basis. Judge Qian 
argued that this legislative fix did not solve the constitutional 
problem. In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court 
agreed, to a limited extent. In order to alleviate concerns that 
the physical freedom of a person subject to both criminal 
punishment and reformatory training might be excessively 
deprived, the Court called on relevant authorities to re-examine 
and revise the phrasing in the Liumang Act. 
As background, in Interpretation No. 384, the Court 
explained that one aspect of due process is that people not be 
punished for the same act twice. Thereafter, in Interpretation 
No. 604, the Court clarified that multiple punishments may be 
imposed for multiple violations and this does not give rise to any 
issue of double punishment. Judge Qian did not contest this 
position. Instead, he contended that the “setting off” system had 
other flaws. Most notably, if a person was imprisoned for one 
year and then, for the same conduct, began reformatory training 
upon release from prison, he would still have one to two years 
left after the one-year deduction. For people sentenced to both 
                                                                                                             
109. ZHONGHUA MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] art. 77 (amended June 11, 
2013) (Taiwan). 
110. Specifically, time spent serving a fixed-term imprisonment (᭷ᮇᚐฮ), 
detention (ᣊᙺ) (as punishment, as compared with pre-trial detention (⨹ᢲ)), and 
rehabilitation measures (ಖᏳ⹦ศ) was set off from reformatory training. 
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prison and reformatory training, only those who were sentenced 
to three or more years in prison thus avoided having to undergo 
reformatory training. As a result, a liumang might as well have 
committed an act that landed him in prison for three years 
rather than a lesser offense that would have resulted, for 
example, in two years of prison and one year of reformatory 
training. 
To highlight the confusion over this practice, Judge Qian 
raised an example from the 2003 Legal Symposium of the High 
Court of Taiwan and its Subsidiary Courts. Judges discussed the 
following scenario at the symposium: if reformatory training and 
a ten-month prison sentence were proposed for the same act 
and the prison sentence was finalized first, what should the 
courts do? One position was that the prison sentence should 
commence and be completed first, based on the “first finalized, 
first enforced” principle. Another view was that the person 
should not be sent to prison but only to reformatory training 
because, as a result of the short length of the prison sentence, to 
first send the person to prison would effectively result in double 
punishment (i.e., ten months in prison followed by a minimum 
of one year in reformatory training). The very purpose of setting 
off sentences was to avoid such scenarios. Despite the logical 
force of the second viewpoint, the discussion ended with a 
decision to side with the first position—“first finalized, first 
enforced”—regardless of the length of the criminal sentence, 
highlighting that illogical is not the same as unconstitutional. 
Under the Liumang Act, reformatory training could last up 
to three years. If a person served a ten-month prison sentence 
and then began reformatory training, the total time behind bars 
thus would exceed the three-year maximum only if he spent 
more than two years and two months in reformatory training. 
Nonetheless, we agree with Judge Qian’s position that this would 
always constitute “double punishment” no matter how long the 
duration of reformatory training, and surely anyone whose 
reformatory training was about to exceed two years and two 
months, having served ten months in prison for the same act, 
would have had an even stronger claim for legal relief. That dual 
imposition of reformatory training and prison time constituted 
“double punishment” is buttressed by the reality that the two 
reformatory training facilities also housed regular convicts 
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under the same roof, albeit in separate areas of the facilities, and 
that both types of inmates often shared the same training 
classes. When a person finished his criminal sentence, he may 
have just moved to a different cell in the same facility to begin 
his liumang sentence. In other words, the naked eye could not 
discern a qualitative difference in the nature of the criminal and 
liumang punishments. The difference between prison and 
reformatory training was thus quite blurred. 
In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court quoted 
Article 19 of the Liumang Act, which provided in part:  
The term of reformatory training is set at more than one 
year and less than three years. After completion of one year, 
if the executing authorities believe that it is unnecessary to 
continue reformatory training, they may report, with facts 
and evidence, to the original ruling court for its permission 
and exempt the person from further reformatory training. 
The Court pointed out that when criminal punishment or 
rehabilitation measures were first carried out for more than 
three years, there was no need to then commence reformatory 
training because of the mutual set-off provision. In other words, 
the punishment for the corresponding criminal case already 
exceeded the maximum allowable sentence to reformatory 
training. Accordingly, this situation did not raise doubts 
regarding excessive restrictions on people’s physical freedom. 
The Justices therefore focused their attention on the 
situation when criminal punishment or rehabilitation measures 
were first carried out for less than three years. Because public 
security tribunals did not sentence liumang to a fixed term of 
reformatory training, a liumang could serve anywhere between 
the statutory minimum and maximum (i.e., one to three years) 
and that determination was made based on the liumang’s 
progress at the training institute. As a result, the exact amount 
of time that the liumang should serve in reformatory training 
following completion of criminal punishment or rehabilitation 
measures was unclear. For example, if a person already served 
two years in prison, did he then still have to complete the 
minimum one year in reformatory training for a total time 
behind bars of three years? Alternatively, could the training 
institute personnel agree to release him immediately because he 
had already spent more than the minimum one-year term 
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behind bars? If the Liumang Act was interpreted as meaning 
that reformatory training should be enforced for a minimum of 
one year beyond the criminal sentence, the Court cautioned 
that the physical freedom of the person subject to reformatory 
training might be excessively restricted. In Interpretation No. 
636, the Court commanded the relevant authorities to re-
examine and revise the Liumang Act to alleviate this concern. 
In a partial concurring opinion, three Justices faulted the 
majority for not addressing whether the Liumang Act violated 
the principle of ne bis in idem, which translates from Latin as 
“not twice for the same,” and means that no legal action can be 
instituted twice for the same cause of action.111 Namely, this 
concern arose because of the substantial overlap between 
offenses in the Criminal Code (and specialized criminal laws) 
and liumang acts, an issue also raised by Professor Wang. It was 
standard practice for suspected liumang to face concurrent 
criminal charges stemming from the same acts. The concern 
that people were thus being tried in court twice for the same 
underlying acts was very real even though the Constitutional 
Court failed to address this issue head-on in Interpretation No. 
636. 
                                                                                                             
111. According to Judge Qian’s view, the principle that people not be punished 
for the same act twice is also called “the principle of the prohibition against double 
jeopardy” (㞬㔜༴㞋⚗Ṇཎ๎). This statement is misleading because the two concepts 
are not necessarily coextensive. This highlights a vexing problem in comparative law 
terminology and translations. Some of Taiwan’s terminology comes from Germany, 
some from Germany via Japan, some from the United States, and still other 
terminology is unique to China/Taiwan. The principle of ne bis in idem is varyingly 
translated in Taiwan as “do not punish the same behavior twice” (୍⾜Ⅽ୙஧⨩), “do 
not punish the same act twice” (୍஦୙஧⨩), “do not punish the same act again” (୍஦
୙෌⨩), “prohibition against repeat punishments” (⚗Ṇ㔜」⹦⨩), and “prohibition 
against double punishments” (⚗Ṇ㞬㔜⹦⨩). In Interpretation No. 604, the majority 
opinion used “do not punish the same behavior twice” (୍⾜Ⅽ୙஧⨩), but concurring 
and dissenting opinions by justices in this same interpretation used other formulations. 
Judge Qian also argued that the Liumang Act violated the principle that the “same 
matter not be tried twice” (୍஦୙෌⌮) because the criminal and liumang cases arising 
from a single act were tried before different courts in different proceedings. In 
addition to constitutional concerns, Judge Qian argued that this practice wasted 
judicial resources and was unnecessary, a critique shared by judges whom we 
interviewed. 
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F. The Liumang Act as a Second Criminal Procedure Code 
The most fundamental question according to Judge Qian 
was whether Taiwan needed to have a “second Criminal 
Procedure Code” that resulted in the accused being subject to 
two proceedings and the concomitant waste of judicial 
resources. This, however, is a policy argument more properly 
directed at the Legislative Yuan. As expected, the Constitutional 
Court declined to address this issue. 
The argument that the concurrent use of the liumang and 
criminal justice systems squandered resources may not be a 
constitutional one, but it is a compelling one. Judge Qian 
argued that the Liumang Act, in its entirety, contradicted the 
proportionality principle because there were alternative means 
to obtain the same legislative purposes as the Liumang Act but 
with less harm.112 Judge Qian raised this paramount question in 
the final pages of the Taoyuan Petition. He asserted that there 
were still a number of unconstitutional provisions, singling out 
the secret witness system as a particularly egregious 
constitutional violation. Put simply, he drew the Constitutional 
Court’s attention to how glaringly antiquated the Liumang Act 
had become. Like Judge Qian, over the course of our research 
we recognized the Liumang Act’s historical role in combating 
the criminal underworld, yet we seriously questioned the 
continuing need for it under Taiwan’s present day legal system. 
Thankfully, the executive and legislative branches finally 
conceded that the time to retire the Liumang Act had arrived. 
V. FROM INTERPRETATION NO. 636 TO REPEAL 
In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court gave 
the Legislative Yuan one year to fix the constitutional infirmities 
in the Liumang Act, or the offending provisions would become 
null and void.113  The countdown to February 1, 2009, had 
begun. 
                                                                                                             
112. For support, Judge Qian invoked Interpretation No. 544, in which the 
Justices cited the availability of other alternative means to attain the same purposes with 
less harm as a component of whether a law is consistent with the proportionality 
principle. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 31. 
113. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1, Reasoning, para. 14 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2008).  
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Based on experience with the first two constitutional 
interpretations that addressed the Liumang Act, conventional 
wisdom expected that the legislature would once again revise 
the Act in a piecemeal fashion in order to meet only the 
minimal requirements laid down by the Constitutional Court. As 
the year wore on, it also looked increasingly likely that those 
revisions would come at the final hour, as was done with 
previous amendments. Although the Legislative Yuan had always 
held the power to abolish the Liumang Act, that scenario was 
deemed unlikely, both because the Court had called for only 
limited revisions and because there is no political capital to be 
gained by looking soft on crime, in Taiwan or elsewhere. 
Prospects for repeal were further dampened in light of the 
insistence on keeping the Liumang Act even after the Court 
declared part of the Act unconstitutional in 1995 and 2001. 
Following these earlier interpretations, the legislature 
emphasized that the Act was an efficient weapon to crack down 
on crime (ᤲ㯭฼ჾ. 
Adding another obstacle to reform, whether well-founded 
or not, police and other officials with whom we spoke repeatedly 
stated that the common people supported the Liumang Act 
because they were afraid of liumang. This is not to say that all 
police were against revising the Liumang Act. A National Police 
Agency official told us that he supported revisions done through 
the people’s representatives in order to improve the Act. This 
same official emphasized that people need to consider the 
victim’s perspective because there are times when the criminal 
law alone is insufficient. For example, what if upon leaving a 
restaurant you find a man standing next to your car who politely 
                                                                                                             
In light of the fact that amending the law requires a certain period of time—
and so that the relevant authorities can conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
the Act by taking into consideration both the need to protect people’s rights 
and the need to maintain social order—those parts of the following 
provisions that are inconsistent with relevant principles of the Constitution 
shall become null and void no later than one year from the date of this 
Interpretation: Article 2, Section 3, regarding the act of ‘“tyrannizing good 
and honest people,”’ Section 5 of the same Article regarding ‘“people who 
are habitually morally corrupt or who habitually wander around and act like 
rascals,”’ and Article 12, Paragraph 1, which excessively restricts the 
transferred person’s right to confront and examine witnesses and to access 
court files. 
Id. 
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tells you that he has watched your car so that it would not be 
stolen, and shouldn’t you give him a little money to buy 
something to drink? The threat is implicit but easily understood. 
Opponents of the Liumang Act countered that the Criminal 
Code is sufficient to deal with these kinds of situations, such as 
through Article 304, which covers crimes of coercion (ᙉไ⨥). 
There is also the Social Order Maintenance Law, which 
authorizes detention (ᣊ␃) for up to five days for various types 
of injurious conduct.114 A person may, for instance, be punished 
by such detention for using another person’s identifying 
documents or for deceiving by carrying a toy gun that looks like 
a real gun and thereby endangering safety.115 
Then, in the autumn of 2008, the new administration of 
President Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly broke the political 
stalemate. On November 17, 2008, the Executive Yuan 
submitted a proposal to the Legislative Yuan for abolition of the 
Liumang Act. In the proposal, the Executive Yuan set forth five 
reasons in support of its position. First, as pointed out in the 
concurring opinion to Interpretation No. 636, even if the 
legislature revised the Act, there would still be lingering 
questions regarding the constitutionality of reformatory 
training. The Executive Yuan even borrowed the language in the 
concurring opinion when arguing that it was difficult to make 
the Liumang Act compatible with the Constitution no matter 
how it was revised.  
Second, the Executive Yuan argued that the legal nature of 
the Act was unclear because it contained components of both 
administrative law and criminal law. The Executive Yuan bluntly 
asked whether provisions in the Act actually belonged to 
administrative law or criminal law, and it further pointed out 
that the unclear nature of the Act made it difficult to protect the 
rights and interests of the accused.  
Third, the overlap between the Liumang Act and criminal 
laws resulted in needless duplication. This point clearly echoed 
the arguments raised by Judge Qian regarding the necessity and 
wisdom of perpetuating the liumang system. 
                                                                                                             
114. ZHONGHUA MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] art. 19 (amended June 11, 
2013) (Taiwan). 
115. Id. arts. 66 § 2, 65 § 3. 
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Fourth, enforcement of the amended Act would have 
created administrative difficulties; after noting the 
Constitutional Court’s holding that an accused liumang had a 
right to be heard during the proceedings before the review 
committee, the Executive Yuan advised that this would impose a 
further burden on the committee’s work.  
Finally, the Executive Yuan urged that times had changed 
and, not only was the Act no longer necessary, it was contrary to 
Taiwan’s increasing embrace of human rights. The Executive 
Yuan briefly traced the Act’s history since 1955 and concluded 
that criminal laws and the Social Order Maintenance Law were 
sufficient for society’s current needs. To underscore this point, 
the Executive Yuan attached an appendix with a table setting 
forth the different types of liumang behavior and how criminal 
laws and the Social Order Maintenance Law could be used to 
address the same behavior. 
Legislative debate ensued in December 2008, and 
representatives of the Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, and 
National Police Agency testified before the Legislative Yuan. 
Legislators raised concerns that criminal laws alone would be 
insufficient to protect the public and further inquired about the 
impact of releasing incarcerated liumang. One legislator 
estimated that, of twenty-three county and city police 
departments, sixteen supported repeal—to which the National 
Police Agency representative replied that left seven police 
departments which supported only revising the Act.116  
The majority police support for abolishing the Act might 
seem odd at first glance, given that the Act provided police with 
an additional tool to remove troublemakers from the street. We 
can only speculate because the legislative record does not clarify 
why the vast majority of police departments reportedly 
supported repeal. Perhaps it was because the police too were 
embracing a more human-rights friendly approach. It might also 
have been because police were eager to be rid of a rigid point 
system that led to demerits if liumang quotas were not met.  
Despite some legislators’ concerns, the voices for abolition 
prevailed by assuaging fears that repeal would lead to a 
                                                                                                             
116. See Legis. Yuan, 7th Term, 2d Sess., 2d Meeting Rec., 98 LEGIS YUAN GAZ. 501 
(2008). 
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deterioration in public order and by emphasizing the antiquated 
nature of the Liumang Act. On January 23, 2009, the Legislative 
Yuan officially voted to repeal the Act. Because most 
incarcerated liumang had concurrent criminal sentences, only 
176 liumang were actually released upon repeal, providing 
persuasive evidence that the Act had become superfluous. 
The retirement of the Liumang Act is a testament to the 
spirit of legal reform in Taiwan. The executive and legislative 
branches both deserve credit for recognizing that the Act had 
outlived its time and for carrying out their respective duties in a 
democratic, cooperative, and transparent manner. Reform-
minded scholars and lawyers also deserve praise for pushing the 
debate forward even when it was politically unpopular to do so. 
That said, the role of the Constitutional Court—and lower court 
judges who prompted the Court to take a closer look at the 
Liumang Act—deserves special attention both because it is a 
shining example of the Court’s willingness to give heft to 
constitutional rights in post-martial law Taiwan and because the 
Court’s involvement was key to pressuring the other branches to 
take action. In large part thanks to the Constitutional Court, the 
Liumang Act is now a remnant of history, and that is exactly 
what it should be. 
VI. CHINA’S RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOR 
Taiwan was not the only Chinese political system to use a 
police-dominated institution to put people behind bars for long 
periods. Across the Taiwan Strait, police in the PRC have also 
employed a panoply of equivalent, even harsher, measures to 
punish those who are deemed “anti-social” by the authorities. 
Most notoriously, from the mid-1950s until 2013, they had the 
power to dispatch a very broad range of people to what soon 
became known as “re-education through labor” (“RETL”), 
without the need to gain approval from the procuracy 
(prosecuting authorities) or courts, or to allow the intervention 
of lawyers. At the time of abolition, the term of such detention 
was limited to three years, with a possible extension to a fourth 
year by the Committee for the Administration of Re-education-
Through-Labor, which administered RETL sentences. Although 
the Committee was composed of police and officials from other 
branches of the local government, it was controlled by police in 
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reality. Courts could review the detention in accordance with 
China’s Administrative Litigation Law (⾜ᨻ幘幋ἲ), but only 
after the person had been sent off for “re-education.” That 
review process was not invoked in most cases and, even if it 
succeeded (as it did only on rare occasions), offered only 
modest comfort to a person who had continued to be detained 
during the lengthy litigation process. 
Similar to the regime for punishing liumang in Taiwan 
before its abolition, RETL in China was supposedly a “non-
criminal” detention measure for confronting anti-social 
conduct. Nevertheless, in certain respects, the RETL sanction 
was even more severe than criminal punishment. Many criminals 
whose offenses are arguably more harmful to society than those 
of RETL offenders find themselves sentenced to far shorter 
terms than the maximum three or four years that could be 
dispensed to RETL offenders. Domestic and foreign 
investigative reports that hit headlines in RETL’s final year of 
use vividly demonstrated the brutal conditions in labor camps.117 
People subject to RETL recounted exploitive working 
conditions, severe beatings and torture imposed on them.118 
Over the years, calls for abolishing or reforming RETL 
continued. The period of 2003 to 2005 was an initial high point 
of the rising tide against RETL. Some optimistic, influential, and 
energetic law reformers believed that the time had finally come 
to eliminate RETL and put an end to the ability of the police to 
impose long-term administrative detention. In 2004, more than 
420 delegates to China’s National People’s Congress (“NPC”) 
signed a petition calling for the repeal of the RETL system. 
The petition, however, failed to sway powerful forces in the 
government. In particular, China’s Ministry of Public Security 
(“MPS”) was a formidable opponent. The MPS fought to stall 
efforts in the NPC to abolish RETL. Yet, in order to comply with 
                                                                                                             
117. Magazine Exposé Reinvigorates Calls to End RTL, DUIHUA HUMAN RTS. J. (Apr. 
11, 2013), http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/04/magazine-expose-reinvigorates-
calls-to.html. 
118. See New Documentaries Take on the Horrors of China’s Labor Camp System, PROBE 
INT’L (May 7, 2013), http://journal.probeinternational.org/2013/05/07/new-
documentaries-take-on-the-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camp-system/; see also Steven Jiang, 
Chinese Labor Camp Inmate Tells of True Horror of Halloween ‘SOS’, CNN (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/06/world/asia/china-labor-camp-halloween-
sos/index.html?hpt=hp_c1. 
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the demands of current legislation governing deprivations of 
liberty, even the MPS acknowledged that, if RETL was to 
continue, it must finally be authorized by a law enacted by the 
NPC or its Standing Committee. Prior to abolition, the only 
authorization for RETL was a smattering of national and local 
decisions and regulations. 
Although calls for reform of RETL quieted after 2005 and 
again after a burst of interest in 2010, they returned with 
renewed vigor in 2012, in part due to high profile cases that put 
the abuses of the system back in the spotlight.119 The new 
Communist Party leadership, which assumed office in 2012, 
responded with a commitment to reform the system. In January 
2013, reports briefly surfaced that Meng Jianzhu, the newly-
installed chair of the powerful Political-Legal Committee of the 
Communist Party and recent Minister of Public Security, 
directed that the use of RETL be terminated by the end of the 
year. In March 2013, after the NPC’s annual meeting, new 
Premier Li Keqiang told a press conference that, with respect to 
RETL reform, “the relevant departments are working intensively 
to formulate a plan, and it may be laid out before the end of this 
year.”120 Also in early 2013, a number of provinces and cities, 
including Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, Shandong and 
Shenzhen, stopped approving RETL cases, and some labor 
camps in these places were transitioned into compulsory drug 
treatment centers.121  
                                                                                                             
119. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Labor Camps Widens in China, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/opposition-to-labor-
camps-widens-in-china.html?_r=0; Keith Zhai, Rape Victim’s Mother Tang Hui Wins 
Damages Over Labour Camp Sentence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 16, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1283035/rape-victims-mother-tang-hui-
wins-appeal-landmark-labour-camp. 
120. Premier Li Keqiang Meets the Press Today, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 17, 2013), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/17/content_16314566.htm. 
121.  Yunnan Jiao Ting Laojiao Shenpi Zhongguo Kaiqi Laojiao Gaige Guanjian Yi Bu 
(ப༡ྉ೵≛㔁⭉㈡ ୰ᅜᘙྐྵ≛㔁㓡朑ℛ擖ᶨ㬍) [Yunnan’s Suspending of Approval of 
RETL Sentences is a Key Step in China’s Reforming of RETL] (Feb. 6, 2013), http://
www.chinanews.com/fz/2013/02-06/4554405.shtml; see Shandong Sheng Yi Zanting 
Laodong Jiaoyang Shenpi (ᒣ᷄䚩⶚㘪 ≛≐㔁℣⭉㈡) [Shandong Province Suspends 
Approval of RETL Sentences] (July 24, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-
07/24/c_116671976.htm; see also Verna Yu, Labour Camps May Become a Thing of a Past, 
But What Will Replace Them?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 5, 2013), http://
www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1347815/labour-camps-may-become-thing-
past-what-will-replace-them?utm_source=edm; Laojiao Gaige Fang’an huo Quanhui Hou 
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In October, Zhou Qiang, the new President of the Supreme 
People’s Court, asked the courts to “actively cooperate in the 
anticipated reform of RETL, explore and improve institutions to 
speed up trials of minor criminal cases, and to vigorously 
promote community correction work.”122 This was the first sign 
of the judiciary’s involvement in broader reforms regarding 
RETL since the new leadership put forth its reform agenda. 
Zhou was obviously preparing the criminal courts to expect a 
serious increase in their burdens because many offenders 
previously sent to RETL would soon be prosecuted instead. Yet 
there were still reports that the new President, Xi Jinping, was 
encountering daunting opposition from conservatives 
challenging his resolve to abolish RETL.123 
Reformist hopes were rekindled in November 2013 when 
the Decision of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central 
Committee announced the Party’s intent to end RETL.124 The 
Decision—a key document setting forth the Party’s broad 
strategy in economic and social affairs—did not include a 
timeline for abolition or a clear statement of what would happen 
to people currently undergoing RETL. And, despite great 
fanfare in the media regarding the leadership’s call for 
abolition, the actual substance of the proposed legislative 
reform was murky. 
After years of false starts for reforms, opponents of RETL 
had learned to keep their expectations modest. It therefore 
came as a pleasant surprise when the government followed up 
on its pledge and, at the end of December 2013, declared the 
                                                                                                             
Chutai (╂ᩍᨵ㠉᪉᱌ᡈ඲఍ྡྷฟྎ) [Reform of RETL to be Introduced After Plenum] 
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.dfdaily.com/html/33/2013/11/7/1085027.shtml. 
122. Zui Gao Fa: Peihe Laojiao Gaige Tansuo Wanshan Qingwei Xing An Kuai Shen 
Kuai Jie Jihzhi (᭱㧗ἲ㸸㓄ྜ╂ᩍᨵ㠉᥈⣴᏶ၿ戊ᚤฮ᱌ᛌ⸰ᛌ兢ᮘไ) [Supreme People’s 
Court: Supporting Reform of RETL by Exploring and Perfecting the System for Swiftly Handling 
Minor Criminal Cases], XINHUA (Oct. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/
2013-10/23/c_117844201.htm [hereinafter Supreme People’s Court: Supporting 
Reform of RETL]. 
123. Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, Insight—Failure to End China’s Labor 
Camps Shows Limits of Xi’s Power, REUTERS (INDIA), (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-china-politics-xi-insight-idUSBRE9A514U201
31106. 
124. Hannah Beech, China to Close Notorious Re-Education Through Labor Camps, 
TIME (Nov. 16, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/11/16/china-to-close-notorious-re-
education-through-labor-camps/. 
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end of RETL.125 The official government media announced, 
“After abolition, those still serving Laojiao [RETL] time will be 
set free. Their remaining terms will not be enforced.”126 This 
announcement was welcome and overdue. What the 
government failed to clarify, however, was how the types of 
people whom the authorities previously sent to RETL would be 
handled in the future.   
Over the years, reformers had proposed different options 
for either modifying RETL or replacing it with alternative 
sanctions, including enacting the Law for the Correction of 
Unlawful Conduct (待㱽埴ᷢ䞓㱣㱽) to replace RETL, reducing 
the maximum term of RETL from three years to eighteen 
months or even a year, alleviating the harshness of the sanction 
by allowing RETL prisoners more freedom, restricting police 
discretion by clarifying criteria for determining what kind of 
conduct and what type of person should be subject to RETL, 
improving the examination and approval procedures, and 
partially judicializing the process by requiring that in every case 
some type of court review take place before a person was 
consigned to RETL’s administrative punishment.127 
Some reformers took a more radical approach, proposing 
to transform future RETL decisions by the police into mere 
recommendations and to give the decision-making power to the 
courts. In fact, the draft of the Law for the Correction of 
Unlawful Conduct, which had twice been included into the 
NPC’s legislative agenda in 2005 and 2010, reportedly included 
such an arrangement. Yet, the draft was stalled because no 
consensus could be reached on whether the decision-making 
power should be shifted from the police to the courts.128 Pilot 
                                                                                                             
125. Zhu Ningzhu, China Abolishes Reeducation Through Labor, XINHUA (Dec. 28, 
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/28/c_133003042.htm. 
126. Id. 
127. For a detailed discussion of proposed legal reforms, see SARAH BIDDULPH, 
LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWER IN CHINA (2007). 
128. Weifa Xingwei Jiaozhi Fa Shifou Xuyao Zhiding Hai Xu Tongchou Kaolu (待㱽埴
ᷢ䞓㱣㱽㗗⏎暨天⇞⭂往暨亇䬡侫嗹) [Comprehensive Consideration Still Needed to Decide 
Whether to Enact the Law for the Correction of Unlawful Conduct] (Mar. 9, 2013), http://
lianghui.people.com.cn/2013npc//2013/0309/c358677-20734160.html; Weifa Xingwei 
Jiaozhi Fa Nanchan Bei Shi Wei Laojiao Zhidu Zhongjie Zhe (ࠓ待㱽埴ᷢ䞓㱣㱽˫晦ṏ ⿕奮
ᷢ≛㔁⇞⹎买乻侭) [Deemed Terminator of RETL, The Law for the Correction of Unlawful 
Conduct Yet to Pass], XINHUA (Aug. 16, 2012) http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-
08/16/c_112738640.htm. 
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projects on “education and correction of unlawful conduct” 
were the subject of experiments in four cities in 2011, but little is 
known about the content of these projects and whether the 
judiciary was given the power to determine RETL sentences.129 It 
was not until the remarks of the President of the Supreme 
People’s Court in 2013 that it looked likely courts would soon 
step in and handle criminal prosecutions of many offenders who 
were previously processed as RETL targets. 
The final announcement of RETL’s repeal in December 
2013 rightly met with praise from within the PRC and beyond. 
The passing of RETL into history removed a longstanding 
method of violating human rights and brought the PRC one 
step closer towards ratification of the ICCPR. The government’s 
decision to abolish rather than modify RETL of course also 
ended the debate regarding the possibility of more modest 
reforms to the sanction. But abolition did not end the broader 
conversation regarding the state’s ability to deprive people of 
liberty for various anti-social conduct. 
Now that RETL has been abolished, people who previously 
fell within its scope are being shifted to other forms of social 
controls. To be clear, we are not arguing that the all types of 
people previously handled by the RETL system should be set 
free without any government monitoring or more serious forms 
of intervention. The concern, however, is that the fanfare of 
RETL’s demise might mask persisting issues with deprivations of 
liberty that meet neither the PRC’s Criminal Procedure Law nor 
international human rights norms with which the PRC 
government itself has stated its intent to comply. 
For example, most ordinary drug offenders, who 
constituted a major part of the group sent every year to such re-
education, will probably be confined in existing administrative 
treatment centers for up to six months or a year rather than sent 
to court, and the same can be expected for commercial sex 
workers. Even prior to abolition of RETL, international non-
governmental organizations were already raising concerns about 
the use of “custody and education”—another police controlled 
                                                                                                             
129.  Si Shi Shidian Laojiao Zhidu Gaige You Weifa Xingwei Jiaoyu Jiaozhi Qudai (ᅄᕷ
孽䁡≛㔁⇞⹎㓡朑 ⏤待㱽埴ᷢ㔁做䞓㱣⍾ẋ) [Four Cities Reforming RETL by Replacing It 
with Education and Correction of Unlawful Conduct], (Aug. 29, 2012) http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-08/29/c_123642847.htm. 
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sanction—to detain commercial sex workers for months at a 
time.130 Lawyers within China have similarly called for an end to 
the practice.131 
A miscellany of other petty offenders who do not respond 
well to the fifteen-day maximum detention currently dispensed 
by the police under the Security Administration Punishment Act 
(㱣⬱䭉䎮⢬伂㱽) may find themselves in “legal education” 
centers or other types of “community correction” units that have 
detained people for longer periods without judicial approval or 
lawyer’s intervention.132 Others have found themselves detained 
for only a few days under the guise of “legal study classes” even 
if not sent away for longer stays at special centers.133  
Moreover, despite a new mental health law, police are likely 
to continue the involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospitals 
of certain political dissidents, religious or Falun Gong 
adherents, and other recalcitrants. 134  They may also be 
                                                                                                             
130. See “Custody and Education”: Arbitrary Detention for Female Sex Workers in China, 
ASIA CATALYST (Dec. 2013), http://asiacatalyst.org/blog/2013/12/report-custody-and-
education-arbitrary-detention-for-female-sex-workers-in-china.html (“However, largely 
unknown to the general public, similar administrative penalties [to reeducation 
through labor] remain in effect, including the Custody & Education (C&E) system 
targeting commercial sex workers and their clients.”). 
131.  Lushi Jianyi Chexiao “Maiyin Piaochang Renyuan Shourong Jiaoyu Banfa” (ᚊ゗
ᘓ帽᧔枏ᇵ◥Ῐ᎛፛ே⛧ᨲᐜᩍ⫱┭ἲࠔ) [Lawyers Suggest Revoking The Measures on 
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133. See Donald Clarke, Why Chinese Needs a Good Word for “Irony”, and Why it’s Too 
Soon to Bid Farewell to Re-education Through Labor, CHINESE LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 28, 
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2013/11/why-chinese-
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through.html.  
134. “The Darkest Corners”: Abuses of Involuntary Psychiatric Commitment in China, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www2.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/countdown-
china/%E2%80%9C-darkest-corners%E2%80%9D-abuses-involuntary-psychiatric-
commitment-china.  
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increasingly tempted to resort to many forms of illegal 
detention, ranging from kidnapping to “black jails.”135  
Prominent among other politically disempowered groups 
are petitioners, often penniless, who are protesting allegedly 
illegal land takings and other abuses of power by local officials. 
Human rights organizations have documented numerous 
instances of petitioners being detained or forcefully returned to 
their home provinces.136  
At the other end of the power spectrum, even high-ranking 
Party members face their own forms of sanctions without 
procedural protections. It would have been surprising to find 
government officials in a RETL facility, but it is nonetheless 
worth noting the continuing use of severe Party-administered 
deprivations of liberty that lack any judicial intervention.137  
Finally, a number of questions remain for those cases that 
formerly would be siphoned to RETL but will now be handled 
through the formal criminal justice system instead of an 
alternative administrative system. Will they receive the full 
process provided for in the Criminal Procedure Law, 
recognizing that many barriers remain to accessing evidence, 
witnesses, and other information crucial to mounting an 
effective defense?138 Or will they be subject to the truncated 
“simplified procedures” as provided in the Criminal Procedure 
Law or the new, experimental “simple and fast” criminal process 
(戊ฮᛌ⸰Īthat is being used to speed up the adjudication of 
minor crimes that are punishable by three years’ imprisonment 
or less? The President of the Supreme People’s Court 
emphasized the significance of this speedy process as a reform 
                                                                                                             
135. Sophie Richardson, Dispatches: Casting a Light into China’s Black Jails, HUMAN 
RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/dispatches-
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136. See China: Rampant Violence and Intimidation Against Petitioners, HUMAN RTS. 
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137. See Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO. 
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suspected of corruption). 
138. See, e.g., MIKE MCCONVILLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: AN EMPIRICAL 
INQUIRY 5 (2011) (examining these concerns from an empirical perspective). 
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initiative that is intended to supplement the abolition of 
RETL.139  
It is hardly surprising that the PRC is finding ways to push 
minor cases through the criminal justice system: the United 
States, for example, relies overwhelmingly on guilty pleas and 
Taiwan allows “negotiation procedures” for minor offenses.140 
What remains to be seen with China is what shape Chinese “plea 
bargaining” or other rapid forms of case resolution will take. 
Recent reports that some localities are using criminal 
detention—which allows police to hold suspects up to thirty 
days—as a replacement for RETL indicate that perhaps a tool 
meant for use during the investigation phase is itself being 
turned into a form of punishment.141  
In short, there remain more questions than answers about 
what RETL’s abolition means for the thousands of cases that 
would annually fall under its umbrella. Without a clear vision for 
what a RETL-free PRC will look like, we must wait and see 
whether China’s leadership will finally leave RETL to the history 
books in substance as well as name, as its neighbor across the 
strait has already done. 
Despite the major political, legal, economic, and social 
differences between Taiwan and the PRC, Taiwan’s example can 
be of great assistance to those Mainland law reformers 
concerned with what alternatives are filling the gap left by the 
end of RETL. In China, legal reforms on paper have often failed 
to strengthen significantly the ability of people accused of 
criminal or quasi-criminal violations to challenge the 
government’s case in practice. Thus, there is reason to question 
whether the end of RETL merely “changed the soup but not the 
medicine” (᥮‮୙᥮⸩)or, in terms more familiar to English 
readers, put old wine in new bottles.142 
                                                                                                             
139. Supreme People’s Court: Supporting Reform of RETL, supra note 122. 
140. See Lewis, supra note 13. 
141. Verna Yu, How China Using Criminal Detention in Place of Re-education Through 
Labour, S. CHINA MORNING POST, (April 21, 2014, 3:21 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1492192/china-using-criminal-detention-place-re-education-
through-labour. 
142. CORINNA-BARBARA FRANCIS, AMNESTY INT’L, CHANGING THE SOUP BUT NOT 
THE MEDICINE: ABOLISHING RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOUR IN CHINA (2013), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA17/042/2013/en. 
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Taiwan’s experience offers a tested roadmap for gradually 
reducing arbitrary police powers. For example, knowledge of 
Taiwan’s former bureaucratic procedures for determining who 
should be deemed a liumang, and to what extent, may prove 
useful as the PRC considers how to improve the criteria and the 
procedures for deciding who should be subject to RETL’s 
successors. Indeed, the Taiwan precedent of classifying 
offenders into two categories and subjecting only those in the 
second, more serious category to incarceration may stimulate 
new Mainland thinking about how to reduce the numbers of 
those who are to suffer long-term administrative detention, 
numbers that have been far larger in the PRC than in Taiwan. 
Now that the heads of the local public security apparatus in 
China appear to be playing at least a slightly diminished role in 
the extremely powerful Party political-legal committees that 
control the administration of justice, the time might finally be 
right to start making inroads into the overwhelming police 
influence over decisions when to deprive people of physical 
liberty because of allegedly dangerous behavior. 
As we have suggested, Taiwan’s former administrative 
procedures left much to be desired in terms of their fairness to 
potential targets of the system. Yet Mao himself once exhorted 
“We have had a good many teachers by negative example.” We 
hope that Mainland legislators will regard Taiwan’s now 
abolished procedures not as favorable precedents to be followed 
indefinitely but rather as negative examples to be increasingly 
avoided. The predecessor of the Liumang Act was first 
promulgated in 1955, a repressive era under Chiang Kai-shek’s 
iron-fist rule. By the time of the Liumang Act’s abolition, it was 
deemed a remnant of the past that no longer fit Taiwan’s 
impressive progress toward the rule of law. RETL, similarly, was 
officially established in a turbulent, nightmarish era of the PRC’s 
history. Slowly it, too, became viewed by many in China as 
seriously inappropriate in light of their country’s social and 
economic progress and heightened awareness of the importance 
of protections against arbitrary police conduct. Such an evolving 
consensus added to the reform momentum, as has been 
demonstrated in Taiwan’s case. 
The very inadequacies of the Liumang Act spurred an 
earlier generation of Taiwan reformers to insist upon some form 
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of judicial review of the relevant administrative decisions, 
leading to the establishment of the “security tribunals” in the 
local district courts. One of the key questions confronting those 
Mainland legislators and officials who, despite the formal end of 
RETL, wish to retain long-term administrative detention but in 
some modified form is whether the present system of allowing 
judicial review in principle, albeit restricted in practice, should 
be replaced by a system of compulsory judicial review in every 
case. If so, they will have to determine the nature of that judicial 
review. Should it take the form of the existing review prescribed 
by the PRC’s Administrative Litigation Law? If all administrative 
incarceration decisions are to be reviewed, that would add 
substantially to the burdens of the court system unless the 
number of targets is substantially reduced. Or should some 
specially adapted, more abbreviated, procedures be devised to 
help the courts discharge the expanded duties contemplated? 
In this respect also, the Taiwan experience would be very 
relevant. Knowledge of the origins, operation, advantages, 
disadvantages, and demise of the “security tribunals” should 
prove highly instructive. Again, the special court procedures 
used for liumang cases, if properly assessed in accordance with 
rule of law values, should be regarded as a negative example. 
Despite the authorized participation of defense counsel, the 
failure of the “security tribunals” to provide accused liumang 
with other procedural protections provided to accused criminals 
gave them much of the appearance and reality of the very 
inquisitorial judicial system that Taiwan’s criminal justice 
reforms of the past decade were designed to eradicate. 
Especially appalling were the severe limitations upon the 
opportunities for the target and his counsel to identify and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
Given existing political constraints and other distorting 
influences upon PRC courts, which significantly diminish 
prospects for independent judicial action, it would be most 
unfortunate if the PRC should establish the equivalent of 
Taiwan’s “security tribunals” to review decisions to send people 
to “custody and education,” “community corrections,” or other 
forms of non-criminal deprivations of liberty. That would 
impose further restrictions on fair court procedures while 
misleading the public into thinking that adequate court review 
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was being granted. It would be far better for China’s judicial 
resources to be expanded to ensure that all decisions imposing 
or recommending restraints on liberty will receive in practice 
the same judicial review as currently available in principle under 
the Administrative Litigation Law. Taking reforms a step 
further, it would be even better if witnesses regularly appeared 
in court for many types of cases under both the Administrative 
Litigation Law and Criminal Procedure Law, as compared with 
current practice where witnesses are nearly always absent. 
Of course, real change will also require that judges not only 
be adequate in numbers but also be willing to stand up to the 
police who bring cases before them. We recognize that 
empowering the Chinese judiciary to take a more assertive 
position vis-à-vis the police would be no easy task. Nonetheless, 
making sure that there are adequate numbers of judges to give 
each case serious scrutiny is a necessary first step. Our hope is 
that the prospect of a meaningful judicial review in every case 
where administrative detention is decided upon or 
recommended by the police will stimulate police to be more 
cautious in their appraisals and reduce the number of cases that 
come before the court. 
From a broader perspective, what might China learn from 
our examination of the life and death of the Liumang Act? 
Apart from the desirability of completely abolishing long-term 
administrative detention, we believe the attention of people in 
Mainland China should focus on the roles that democratic 
political-legal institutions played in its gradual reform and 
ultimate demise. Especially prominent was the role of Taiwan’s 
Constitutional Court, an institution that, sadly, has no 
counterpart on the Mainland, where the Standing Committee of 
the NPC has the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution 
but, in practice, does not exercise it. 
For a long period under the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan, 
the Constitutional Court served as mere window dressing for the 
system’s rule of law charade. Yet, as the martial law regime 
began to unravel, the Court began to spread its wings and 
increasingly demonstrate a capacity for imaginatively and 
vigorously holding the other branches of government to the 
legal standards of government under law. In fact, many of the 
Constitutional Court’s new interpretations stimulated, indeed 
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insisted upon, further reforms in accordance with the Justices’ 
impressive knowledge not only of the ROC’s Constitution but 
also of the governments and legal systems of the principal 
Western democracies. The publishing of Justices’ concurring 
and dissenting opinions as well as the Constitutional Court’s 
majority opinion has further spurred a robust debate over the 
meaning of the provisions enshrined in Taiwan’s Constitution. 
As we have shown earlier, the Constitutional Court’s deft 
handling of the sensitive problems of long-term administrative 
detention, beginning in 1995 with the first of three 
interpretations that ultimately led to abolition, is a prime 
illustration of how constitutionalism can fruitfully take root in 
Chinese political-legal culture and benefit the development of 
democratic government and the rule of law. The Court’s 
interpretations wisely selected from and responded to the broad 
range of requests presented to it by increasingly energetic legal 
and judicial experts. Those interpretations made clear that 
many of the features of the Liumang Act were inconsistent with 
the basic values of Taiwan’s rapidly evolving democratic system. 
The Constitutional Court therefore required the legislature, 
with the assistance of the executive, to revise the offending 
provisions within a reasonable time. 
The Constitutional Court’s handling of these cases also 
illustrates the limits under which it exercises its powers. Despite 
the many constitutional failings of the Liumang Act, the Court 
did not believe itself free to invalidate the legislation in its 
entirety. Nor did it assert the power to address issues that were 
not raised by the applications for review that had been 
submitted. These constraints left the overall fate of this 
politically sensitive legislation to the democratically elected 
branches of government, and in 2009, as we have seen, the 
newly-elected KMT administration and the KMT-dominated 
legislature obliged by abolishing it. In this instance, the three 
main branches of the ROC’s distinctive system of five branches 
of government performed in textbook fashion. 
This example of the separation of powers among Taiwan’s 
main branches of government and the ability of the 
Constitutional Court to act as a powerful final arbiter of 
constitutional issues—including operationalizing rights set forth 
in the ROC Constitution—is currently impossible to replicate in 
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the PRC. There, at best, the branches exercise a separation of 
functions under the nominal control of the NPC and its 
Standing Committee, which, like the other branches, are under 
the actual control of the Communist Party. As a result, the exact 
contours of an RETL-free PRC will be shaped by political forces 
instead of by judicial action. 
Although this case history of the recent constitutional 
process in Taiwan should be of enormous interest to Mainland 
reformers, in the present political climate there is little prospect 
that the PRC is ready to consider establishment of a similar 
constitutional court. The most that many experts think feasible 
might be the authorization of a constitutional committee within 
the NPC that would scrutinize all proposed legislation in order 
to determine whether any provisions in the draft are 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Even that may well be more 
than China’s current leaders are prepared to support.  
CONCLUSION 
We began this study when the Liumang Act was still in force 
in Taiwan and RETL was still being used in the PRC. We now 
find ourselves concluding a project that first turned into a 
historical piece for Taiwan and then, several years later, for the 
PRC. Despite these welcome developments, challenges remain 
on both sides of the strait. Taiwan continues to grapple with 
reforms to its criminal justice system, such as introducing citizen 
participation through a type of consultative jury, and with 
broader issues of how to accommodate demands for greater 
citizen participation in the government, as demonstrated during 
the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of the Legislative Yuan in 
March-April 2014. But these issues are part of healthy, open 
debates in a democratic society, not manifestations of 
entrenched police repression. The demise of the Liumang Act 
marked the disappearance of one of the last clear vestiges of 
Taiwan’s authoritarian past. In contrast, the end of RETL 
removed but one of many controversial practices that can be 
used to restrict people’s liberty with few if any checks to ensure 
the decision comports with even the limited protections in the 
PRC’s Criminal Procedure Law. 
We hope that our study offers further support for the true 
demise of RETL, meaning in substance as well as in name, and 
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the establishment of at least a constitutional committee within 
the NPC, if not an independent constitutional court. We also 
hope that the new Xi Jinping leadership has the wisdom to see 
that other forms of unfettered police powers should likewise 
become relics of the past. Surely there are many Taiwan legal 
experts across the strait who are willing and able to provide 
valuable advice on charting a path forward now that RETL 
belongs to the PRC’s past. 
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